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SHIELDING CHILDREN: THE EUROPEAN WAY
MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK* & JACOB H. RoWBOTrOM**
INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing, the dangers posed by the Internet to chil-
dren are making regular headlines in the United Kingdom and else-
where in Europe. In Operation Ore, British police have been
investigating a reported seven thousand credit card subscribers to a
single child pornography web site based in the US. With this come
reports that suspects include judges, lawyers, teachers, university lec-
turers, policemen, and a few celebrities. Some have argued that this is
creating a moral panic.1 The controversy has sparked many difficult
questions as to how many such users may be based in the UK, and
whether there is anything wrong in looking at pictures (as opposed to
actual child abuse).2 In these cases, the issue concerns material viewed
by adult Internet users and whether that material is linked to the ac-
tual abuse of children by encouraging such pictures to be made and
by fuelling the viewers' fantasies that may turn to action. While the
harm caused to children using the Internet has not been overlooked,
it has again been concerned with a link to actual child abuse, espe-
cially through the use of chat rooms. Stories have been reported of
adults arranging to meet children after posing as teenagers in chat
rooms.3
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1. See Calm the Witch-Hunt: Even Child Porn Suspects Have Rights, GUARDIAN, Jan. 18,
2003, at 21, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,3604,877205,00.html.
2. See Philip Jenkins, Cut Child Porn Link to Abusers, GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.guardian.co.uk/online/story/0,3605,879877,00.html; Matthew Parris, Child
Abuse, or a Crime in the Eye of the Beholder? TIMES (London), Jan. 18, 2003, at 24; Networks of
Trust: The Internet and the Abuse of Innocence, Editorial, TIMES (London), Jan. 15, 2003, at 21.
3. Father Rescues Naked Girl After Net Rendezvous, TIMES (London), Jan. 28, 2003, at 8.
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Less sensational are instances where children access material on
the Internet that may not put them at risk of abuse, but that may still
be harmful. Such material may include sexual content or scenes of
violence, material that poses little threat to adults and which adults
should be free to read. This paper investigates the approach taken to
the problem of Internet material that is harmful to children in Europe
and the UK, and locates the discussion within the emerging constitu-
tional jurisprudence in Europe.4
In a nutshell, and inasmuch one can generalize, the current
European solution, unlike the mostly unsuccessful legislative attempts
in the US, tends to leave the regulation of material that is harmful to
children to the market. However, this is not necessarily a civil liber-
tarian heaven. Rather, it is a guided, or directed, legal framework
which actively fosters and encourages self-regulation. In this, it is
closer to-though not exactly the same as-Amitai Etzioni's sugges-
tion that the legal response should first aim at separating children and
adults so to minimize the "spillover" onto the rights of adults, and
alternatively, if the first avenue is ineffective, proposing that limita-
tions on adults are justified when the harm to children is substantial.5
We begin in Part I by drawing the contours of the issue at stake.
We propose an intuitive metaphoric framework to examine the issues
at stake by thinking of the producer of the harmful material and the
child as two ends of a chain, which we call the "pornography chain."
In between there are various other links. We set out several baselines
of the discussion. Firstly, we distinguish between material that should
be put out of reach of both adults and children, such as child pornog-
raphy, and that which is harmful to children but not to adults (some-
times referred to as an illegal/harmful distinction). 6 Secondly, we
assume that there is such harm, and thirdly, we assume that adults do
4. "European Law" is a rather broad term, as there are several levels of legal systems in
Europe; first, each country has its own legal system, second, countries which are members of the
Council of Europe are bound by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"), and third, there is the European Union in which fifteen
states are members at this point. We will discuss the different layers of legal systems in Europe,
especially that of the ECHR. The legal response in the United Kingdom will serve as a leading
example throughout the discussion.
5. See Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHt.-KENT L. REv. 3
(2004).
6. We adopt Dr. Etzioni's distinction between "children" (twelve years and under) and
"teenagers" (thirteen to eighteen years old), and the generic term "minors," which refers to
both groups together. See id. at 43.
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have a constitutional right to access free content online.7 We then
turn, in Part II, to set out the European constitutional background,
wherein free expression is recognized as a human right, and is defined
both in a wider and a narrower manner than the American First
Amendment, in that it explicitly covers the right to receive informa-
tion, but it includes built-in limitations.
In Part III, we survey various possible legal responses to the is-
sue. Firstly, a "direct public-ordering approach" in which the State,
through a statute, administrative act, or judicial decision, announces
what is prohibited and what is permitted. Thus far, European legal
systems have not chosen this approach, but nevertheless, we assess
the constitutional meaning of such a response. Secondly, an "indirect
public-ordering approach," in which the State does not interfere in as
blunt of a manner in the digital environment, but is a player in the
field; it creates various incentives for the players to act in a publicly
desired manner. Thirdly, a "private-ordering approach," where the
State refrains from any kind of interference with the digital arena and
leaves the playground to self-regulation. The approach opted for in
European legal systems seems, at least at this point, a combination of
the latter two.
This is evident, for instance, in the topic of filtering software and
rating programs (private-ordering), public programs of hotlines for
reporting illegal material, encouraging the adoption of codes of con-
duct (public support for private-ordering), rules that impose liability
on Internet Service Providers ("ISP") (indirect public ordering), and
education (public involvement). We demonstrate the legislative ap-
proaches by analyzing some of these rich regulatory tools. In way of
conclusion, we raise a few thoughts as to why it is these approaches
that were preferred in Europe.
I. SETTING THE PROBLEM
A. The Interest in Protecting Children and the Pornography Chain
For the purpose of this Article, we do not quarrel with the as-
sumption that pornography does indeed harm children who are ex-
7. In this case, "free" is used both as in "free speech" and as in "free beer." The distinc-
tion was made in the context of the free software movement by Richard Stallman. See SAM
WILLIAMS, FREE AS IN FREEDOM: RICHARD STALLMAN'S CRUSADE FOR FREE SOFTWARE
ch.9 (2002), available at http://www.faifzilla.org/ch09.html.
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posed to it. The evidence discussed in Etzioni's article suffices to es-
tablish that there is a public interest in protecting children from por-
nography, and more so, from violent material.8 This interest will later
be phrased in constitutional terms as "necessary in a democratic soci-
ety," which is one of the conditions upon which the ECHR allows
restricting freedom of speech.9
Fulfilling this interest does not come without a cost. The cost is
one of limiting the freedom of consenting adults to access these mate-
rials. Before considering the direct clash between the public interest
and the freedom to access online available material, it is first neces-
sary to identify the chain of pornography.10 There are several links in
the chain of pornography, from production to consumption: the pro-
ducer of the material, the web site operator who offers it, the ISP who
provides access to the site or service, the institution through which
access is offered, parents, and, finally, the child end-user. Not all links
appear in all situations: for instance, when we surf from the privacy of
our home, the institutional link drops out of the picture. One strategy
to protect the child end-user might be to impose liability on one of
the links in the pornography chain. Another strategy would be to
focus not on who can prevent the harm, but on the content that passes
through the pornography chain. We first briefly examine the various
links of the chain, and examine whether we can curtail the pornogra-
phy chain there, and whether it is a good solution. We then examine
the second strategy.
1. The Producer or Web Site Operator
Regulation at this point tackles the problem at the source of the
material and thereby restricts every individual's access to the material
regardless of age. But directly imposed limitations on the producer of
the material or the web site operator might run into both serious con-
stitutional and technological difficulties. An adult has the right to
produce certain content, as long as it in itself does not harm others (as
is the case with child pornography) or where there is a constitution-
ally valid limitation on this right. This issue raises the need to distin-
guish the illegal from the legal, an issue which we will address shortly.
Furthermore, due to the architecture of the Internet, especially its
8. See Etzioni, supra note 5, at 33-40.
9. In the US, this interest can be phrased as a "compelling state interest."
10. In the discussion to follow, we focus mostly on pornography, but the arguments apply
to violent content as well.
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borderless character, it might be inefficient to try to block the por-
nography at its source; end-users will access the same harmful mate-
rial, now relocated on web sites operated from other countries, where
the legal standard is more permissive.
2. The ISP
Perhaps we can aim at the next link in the chain: the ISP could be
required to block children from accessing the harmful material. But
current technology does not permit an ISP to easily identify child
users, and therefore any restrictions on content are likely to apply to
adults as much as children. A ten-year-old child who will seek the
services of an ISP might be denied access, most likely because of her
inability to provide the ISP with assurance that she can pay for the
services. But once the service to a home or a public library is estab-
lished, the ISP cannot effectively know whether it is an adult or a
child who uses it at any given minute.
Furthermore, imposing a duty on the ISPs to block the harmful
material raises a host of complex questions, as to the effect on the
rights of the ISPs themselves (their right to property and contract),
the effects of imposing such liability on the development of the Inter-
net in general and of e-commerce in particular, the "chilling effect"
on the ISPs and thus the speech-effects on end-users, effects on the
costs which are associated with imposing liability, and much more.
We will address some of these issues later on in our discussion of the
indirect public-ordering approach.'
3. The Facility
Some institutions have the ability to control access to the physi-
cal facility where the computers are located, and we can assume that
some of these institutions adopt a clear policy as to who may have
access to the location and use of the computers. An Internet cafr, for
example, is more likely to refuse entrance to children, perhaps be-
cause children are less likely to be able to pay for the services. In any
case, the operator of the small Internet caf6 directly faces the patron.
Just like the seller at the newsstand can recognize that it is an eight-
year-old who wishes to buy Playboy, and hence refuse to sell it to the
child, so can the operator of the caf6 refuse access. Other institutions
have the power to adopt and implement clear and enforceable rules
11. See infra, Part III.C.
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as to the access and use of the Internet within their physical bounda-
ries. An elementary school, for example, in which there are com-
puters and access to the Internet, is likely to prohibit access to
pornographic web sites. The physical presence of both the operator
and the child enables control over access.
The difficulty identified by Etzioni arises in situations where
both adults and minors use the same physical location to access the
Internet, such as many public libraries. Indeed, much of the legal de-
bate has evolved around libraries.
12
4. The Parents
The parents have a place in the pornography chain by providing
access to the Internet in the home, or by providing the parental con-
sent that some public facilities require before granting access. By de-
ciding where and when the child can have access to the Internet, the
parent can determine what content the child views. This approach
creates the impression that the rights of a child are an adjunct to and
subordinate to those of a parent. The ECHR, discussed below, gives
little guidance on resolving conflicts between the rights of the child
and the parent that may arise in this situation, 3 and views the family
as a zone of laissez-faire, trusting parents to be able to make the best
choices for the child. This may explain the general preference in
Europe for parental restrictions on access to the Internet, rather than
externally imposed limitations. While both the conservatives and civil
libertarians prefer to trust the parental choices, the premise is ques-
tionable given that many parents lack the understanding to restrict
what children access on the Internet and may not know much about
the level of harm that may be caused. 14 Consequently, such an ap-
proach must be supported with sufficient resources and support to
allow parents to make an informed choice.
12. In the US, see Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 777 (Ct. App.
2001); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552
(E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd,
123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003); Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet
Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1117 (2000); and Junichi P. Semitsu, Note, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Inter-
net Filtering Software Vs. The First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 509 (2000). In the UK, see
infra, text accompanying note 147.
13. See Jane Fortin, Rights Brought Home for Children, 62 MOD. L. REV. 350, 354, 357
(1999).
14. See Lilian Edwards, Pornography and the Internet, in LAW AND THE INTERNET: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 307 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds.,
2000).
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5. Users
Perhaps we should turn to the last link in the chain-the minor
consumers. Etzioni suggests that we distinguish between minors of
various ages, which he roughly divides into two groups: children and
teenagers. 5 This is a much-needed distinction, but the difficulty of
distinguishing between these two groups is the same that drives and
underlies the entire problem discussed here: the current architecture
of the Internet lacks the ability to recognize the user. A famous New
Yorker cartoon features a dog sitting by a computer, accompanied by
the caption, "On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog.' 1 6 A web
site operator cannot know who the end-user is. At most, the operator
can recognize the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the user. The IP
address can be analyzed, but the information recovered will only indi-
cate the ISP used by the user to connect to the Internet. This might
indicate a rough geographical location, but usually not more than
that. 7 The ISP, as discussed above, is also limited in its ability to rec-
ognize the user. Hence, the way to recognize the end-user depends on
the minor user's own cooperation.
But minor users cannot be trusted to identify themselves as mi-
nors or as adults. In the absence of strong social condemnation
against surfing web sites with "adult content," and as long as democ-
ratic societies value the privacy of users, including children, then
counting on the subjects of the public interest will not be an efficient
solution. A requirement to "click here if you are under 18" is unlikely
to deter many minors. Hence, using the law to curtail the pornogra-
phy chain at the minor-user's link is unlikely to succeed. Of course,
ultimately, it is all a matter of education, and the question addressed
here is whether the law or technology should-or could-replace
education or aid it.
6. Technology
There has been an attempt to develop and utilize technological
measures to differentiate the end-users, including various age-
verification measures, which ask the end-user to prove his or her age
by providing a driver's license number, credit card number, and the
15. See Etzioni, supra note 5, at 43.
16. The author of the cartoon is Peter Steiner. See NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61.
17. Several sites offer an analysis of users' privacy in order to demonstrate the ease with
which information can be retrieved. See, e.g., http://privacy.net/.
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like, or by using authentication certificates. 18 However, these can be
easily bypassed, either technologically or by providing false informa-
tion, or simply by using an adult's documents. These measures have
the further unintended effect of deterring adults from accessing legal
web sites and imposing heavy costs on various service providers. In
addition, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted, requiring web-site opera-
tors to install age verification measures imposes heavy costs on non-
commercial speakers.1 9
The intermediate conclusion is that given the practical problems
in regulating the various links of the chain described above, the cur-
rent solutions using technology to differentiate between children and
adults are likely to be only partially successful at best. In this context,
it is important to note that Etzioni's child-adult separation approach
refers to the physical, off-line links in the pornography chain, such as
the facility, rather than to the on-line links, such as the ISPs.2° How-
ever, the physical, institutional, educational, and technological barri-
ers are not impassable.
A different strategy to prevent harm might be to target the con-
tent that passes through the pornography chain, rather than to target
the links thereof. This requires that we are able to define "good" con-
tent, or at least "harmful" content. This distinction is crucial for an-
other basic assumption which accompanies the debate, namely, that
adults have a right to produce and/or to access pornography or vio-
lent material, even if the same material is harmful to children. It also
affects the scope of the rights of web site operators."
B. Illegal and Legal Content
Various European institutions have explicitly made the distinc-
tion between the legal and the illegal and treated them in two differ-
ent ways.22 This brings to mind the American distinction between
18. For a discussion of authentication, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS
OF CYBERSPACE 30-36 (1999) (arguing that "the absence of self-authenticating facts in cyber-
space reduces its regulability").
19. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997).
20. See Etzioni, supra note 5, at 29-30. Etzioni proposes that libraries allocate separate
computers to children and to adults. This proposal sets out a simple and easy solution for librar-
ies. However, it does not resolve the broader problem of children accessing harmful material in
other situations.
21. Later on, we explain how this distinction between adults and children relates to another
distinction we make, regarding the various kinds of regulation. See infra, Part III.A.
22. See European Commission, Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human
Dignity in Audiovisual and Information Services, COM(96)483 final at 6 (recognizing a category
[Vol 79:175
SHIELDING CHILDREN: THE EUROPEAN WAY
"obscene" and "indecent." While the First Amendment does not
cover the former, the latter enjoys constitutional protection.23 Obvi-
ously, the difficulty lies in drawing the line between the two kinds of
content -a problem with which American courts struggle. 24 This diffi-
culty in itself has a price-the unclear boundaries of the "illegal"
might deter not only illegal speech, but also legitimate content. The
laws determining what content is illegal in Europe are drawn up by
each Member State, and different countries will draw the balance
differently. In this section, we consider the English attempt to define
the line between the legal and the illegal, and examine its applicability
to the Internet.
It is obvious that it would not be satisfactory to make all material
harmful to children illegal. The question of illegality raises the consti-
tutional issue of determining what types of material no one should
have access to and that deserve no protection. Powerful reasons exist
to make some types of speech illegal, as, for example child pornogra-
phy has been made under the Protection of Children Act of 1978 in
the UK.2 Other types of material are harmful to some parts of society
but not others, thereby deserving of at least some constitutional pro-
tection. This may include written words that have some sexual or
adult themes, descriptions of violence, or strong language that may be
of material that violates human dignity and that should be banned for everyone regardless of
age) [hereinafter Green Paper]; see also Council Recommendation 98/560/EC of 24 Sept. 1998
on the Development of the Competitiveness of the European Audiovisual and Information
Services Industry by Promoting National Frameworks Aimed at Achieving a Comparable and
Effective Level of Protection of Minors and Human Dignity, art. 17, 1998 O.J. (L 270) 48 (not-
ing that the distinction between materials that are offensive to human dignity and those that are
harmful to minors is vital, and that the two types of problems require a different approach)
[hereinafter Council Recommendation].
23. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942). For what it means to
be "covered," see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89
(1982).
24. The definitive test was set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). It states the
basic guidelines:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). The digital environment raises some challenges to this test. For
example, what is the "community" and according to whose standards is the decision made? The
Supreme Court Justices have expressed various opinions in this regard. See Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564 (2002). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Third Circuit, which once
again ruled that COPA is unconstitutional, albeit on different grounds than the previous hold-
ing. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3rd Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 399 (2003).
25. Protection of Children Act, 1978, c.37.
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unsuitable for a child. The difficulty with this type of material is de-
termining the balance between the two competing groups.
The difficulties in striking this balance and the application to the
Internet are illustrated by the British obscenity laws. In England and
Wales, the line between illegal and harmful material is blurred by the
way illegal obscene speech is defined. Under the obscenity laws, it is a
criminal offense to publish an obscene article and to possess an ob-
scene article with the intent to publish it for gain.26 By focusing on the
publisher, the Act tackles the dissemination of such material at the
source, although the Act is enforced against those involved in dis-
semination lower down the chain, such as the seller. Obscene material
was first defined in the common law by the courts, in the Victorian
case of Hicklin,27 as material that tended to "deprave and corrupt"
those into whose hands the publication may fall. If the Hicklin test
were to be applied "as is" to the Internet, it would have a far-reaching
effect, as most material has the potential to be accessed by at least a
small number of minors, on whom it may have greater corrupting
effect.
The common law test has since been replaced by the 1959 and
1964 Obscene Publications Acts that retain the "deprave and cor-
rupt" test, but provide that it is to be applied to persons who are
likely to read, see, or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.2
"Persons" has been held to mean both a "significant" 29 and "more
than negligible ' 30 proportion of those likely to read the material, and
the test varies according to the circumstances of each case.31 The Act
therefore does not impose liability if the material will "deprave and
corrupt" only a small number of incidental viewers. Nor does the
threshold for "deprave and corrupt" assume some standard of purity
in most readers. For example, if the readers were already "corrupted"
and familiar with pornographic material, it can still be obscene in so
far as it feeds an existing habit or makes it worse. Consequently, a
different standard applies to material likely to be read by adults, as
opposed to teenagers. As Lord Wilberforce stated in DPP v. Whyte:
26. See Obscene Publications Act, 1959, c.66; Obscene Publications Act, 1964, c.74. The
Acts do not prohibit the possession of an obscene article for private use.
27. The Queen v. Hicklin, 3 L.R. 360, 371 (1868). The Hicklin test was used by the US
courts, but was rejected by the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
See also ACLU, 535 U.S. at 574-75.
28. Obscene Publications Act of 1959 § 1(1).
29. R. v. Calder & Boyars Ltd., [1969] 1 Q.B. 151 (C.A.).
30. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Whyte, [1972] A.C. 849, 864-66 (H.L.).
31. R. v. Perrin [2002] EWCA Crim 747, 1 30 (C.A.).
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the tendency to deprave and corrupt is not to be estimated in rela-
tion to some assumed standard of purity of some reasonable aver-
age man. It is the likely reader. And to apply different tests to
teenagers, members of men's clubs or men in various occupations
or localities would be a matter of common sense.
32
While this test creates a flexible approach that does not reduce
all permissible speech to that suitable for a child, problems in control-
ling access could lead to greater liability for publications via the
Internet. Materials that are legal in other media, such as non-
hardcore pornography,3 3 may be more easily accessible by children,
for example, where no password or fee is required, and would have a
corrupting effect on those children.34 Consequently, a significant pro-
portion of the likely readership of Internet material may be children,
giving the Obscene Publications Act a further reach on the Internet
than with traditional media.
35
Whether such a broad application of the Act would arise in rela-
tion to the Internet is questionable, given the more liberal approach
of English juries in recent decades. Section 3 of the Human Rights
Act of 1998 also works against such an interpretation, as legislation
has to be interpreted to give effect to the ECHR, including the right
to free expression.3 6 Furthermore, the police and prosecutors practice
tolerance 37 and do not seek to enforce the laws on pornography in
traditional formats, such as magazines, that could be accessed by chil-
dren. Such tolerance prevents the Act from being used as an instru-
ment of moral paternalism in practice, even though that is the
32. Whyte, [1972] A.C. at 863.
33. While the Obscene Publications Act is most frequently invoked against materials with
sexual content, it can apply to any material thought to deprave and corrupt, such as materials
encouraging drug use or depicting violence. See R. v. Skirving, [1985] 1 Q.B. 819 (C.A.); see also
Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. A. & B.C. Chewing Gum Ltd., [1968] 1 Q.B. 159.
34. See Perrin, [2002] EWCA Crim at 11-12. In Perrin, the trial jury convicted the defen-
dant of publishing obscene material that was featured in a trailer free of charge to anyone with
access to the Internet, but acquitted for materials that required name, address, and credit card
details.
35. Even when considering material that only adults can purchase, courts should still con-
sider the likelihood of that material falling into the hands of a child. The British Video Appeals
Committee thought videos sold at specialty adult stores would be accessed by children infre-
quently. See R. v. Video Appeals Committee of the British Board of Films Classification, [2000]
E.M.L.R. 850, $ 24 (Q.B.).
36. The Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, has a significant impact on UK constitutional law,
and we shall return to it later on.
37. Prosecutors have been reported to have policies regarding which material deserves
prosecution. For example, prosecutors will tolerate material with nudity, but draw the line at
images of an erect penis. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE
LAW 190 (6th ed. 1989). Prosecutors may now demonstrate greater tolerance since those re-
ports, given that hardcore pornography can be legally sold at some licensed stores.
20041
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
rationale behind the wording of the statute, as discussed below. Such
an approach has led to criticisms that the Obscene Publications Act is
inconsistently applied and does not represent a clear principle.38 The
scope of the Act is further limited by the statutory defense that the
article is in the public good on the grounds that it is in the interests of
science, literature, art, or learning, or other objects of general con-
cern.3 9 This helps address the concern that the Act could restrict in-
formation that would be essential for children, for example,
information on family planning or safe-sex education.
The focus on the likely reader contrasts with the US test for ob-
scenity, which refers to the average person,40 and unlike the US test,
the Obscene Publications Act makes no reference to the offensive-
ness of the material. 41 In England and Wales, if the material is so of-
fensive that it would repulse and thereby avert any corrupting
influence, it will remain legal. The question as to what material would
"deprave and corrupt" is an issue of fact to be decided by the jury and
means more than just material that is loathsome or lewd.42 The appli-
cation of the standard varies according to the composition, back-
ground, and values of the jury, and will be assessed in the light of
contemporary standards.43 The question is not determined by looking
at the content of the material, but rather on its effect on the mind of
the reader. Consequently, demonstrating that reading the material
will lead to a specific harmful activity is unnecessary. 44 In this, the Act
takes a paternalistic approach to the harm; it does not aim to prevent
individuals from being confronted with publications that they do not
want to see, but stops readers from seeing material that they may well
38. Yaman Akdeniz & Nadine Strossen, Sexually Oriented Expression, in THE INTERNET,
LAW AND SOCIETY 207, 211 (Yaman Akdeniz et al. eds., 2000) (citing David Pannick, Question:
When Is Disgusting Not Obscene?, TIMES (London), Sept. 8, 1998, at 39).
39. Obscene Publications Act of 1959 §§ 4(1), (2). This defense balances the interest of the
community in receiving the material against the harm to the individual identified in the first part
of the offense. Compare this defense to the third prong of the Miller test, applied in the US. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
40. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 264 (1985).
41. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; BARENDT, supra note 40, at 264. However, offensiveness of
content is still relevant to common law offenses, such as outraging public decency. See R. v.
Gibson, [1990] 2 Q.B. 619, 622-24 (C.A.).
42. See R. v. Anderson, [1972] 1 Q.B. 304, 305,311-15 (C.A. 1971).
43. See BARENDT, supra note 40, at 256-57. Compare this to the first prong of the Miller
test, applied in the US, where the standard is that of the "average person" in the community.
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
44. For a discussion of the link between the two, see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
OBSCENITY AND FILM CENSORSHIP [Cmnd. 7772], 61-95 (1979).
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enjoy for fear that it undermines their moral state.45 While the restric-
tion may seem contrary to the principles of a liberal account of free
speech that stress individual autonomy and the freedom to choose
lifestyle and moral actions,46 it may seem more suitable for children
that are not yet deemed responsible enough to make their own
choices as to what materials are suitable to read.47 However, this
comes at a high price if it requires restricting the choices of adults and
older minors.
By defining illegal speech by reference to its audience, the Act
may encourage publishers to restrict access to potentially corrupting
material. However, the Act is distinct from the approach taken by
Etzioni, the focus of which is to restrict access to the material rather
than to suppress it.48 By contrast, the Act is a blunt instrument in that
material cannot be published at all if thought to "deprave and cor-
rupt" the likely reader, and thereby cannot be viewed by those poten-
tial readers on whom it has little chance of harming at all. However,
the types of media used at the time of enactment may have influenced
the strategy employed by the Act. Suppression of the source has tra-
ditionally been thought to be easier than regulating access. However,
when addressing pornography on the Internet, unlike in print media,
suppressing the first link in the pornography chain is not always easy,
to say the least. The source can hide behind anonymous names, use
technical means to disguise his or her identity, and can be outside the
jurisdiction. Despite these difficulties, the Act has been applied to the
Internet, though the practical issues concerning enforcement in this
context will be considered below.
The Obscene Publications Act provides a theoretical route for
preventing the publication of materials deemed harmful to children
by making such publications illegal. However, such a route is unlikely,
given the more relaxed approach to the application of the Act in
which only publications with an extreme sexual content are targeted
for prosecution and likely to secure a jury conviction. Furthermore,
the features of the Internet make this type of regulation inappropri-
45. For a criticism of such paternalism in relation to Hicklin, and comparable problems in
the US law, see 2 JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS 165-89 (1985).
46. See John Gardner, Freedom of Expression, in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN
BRITAIN 209 (Christopher McCrudden & Gerald Chambers eds., 1994).
47. While the problems of an overbroad interpretation have been considered, the Act may
offer too little protection for children from material that is thought to be harmful to them, but
not enough to "deprave and corrupt."
48. See Etzioni, supra note 5, at 42-47.
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ate. By making the standard dependent on the likely audience, the
Act could suppress a wider range of material and thereby spill over
into adult rights of expression. Furthermore, it is especially difficult to
bring prosecutions that suppress the source of Internet material. In-
stead, the approach that is promoted by the UK government in limit-
ing the harm caused to children on the Internet is through self-
regulation and the promotion of responsible use.
C. Adults' Rights
The discussion thus far has assumed that adults have a different
stake than children and that material that is likely to harm the latter is
unlikely to harm the former. But the argument is stronger than this. It
is that adults have a right to access this material, and that this right is
part of, or derivative of, their freedom of expression. Given the much-
debated nature of pornography, this assumption is not trivial and re-
quires some elaboration. The discussion is limited to the material that
is not deemed harmful to adults. In regard to such material, and given
the notorious effects of pornography, what is the free-speech interest
in consuming it?49 The position described above reflects the civil liber-
tarian view. However, under "European law" this is only the begin-
ning of the constitutional scrutiny. Acknowledging "rights" does not
necessarily infer that they are trumps. As we will discuss in the next
part, there is room for balancing.
The American discourse regarding freedom of speech stems from
the First Amendment, which reads in its relevant part, "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press."50 This language seems to cover the rights of speakers, but does
not extend to listeners. Indeed, listeners' rights were recognized only
in an indirect manner. Courts acknowledged that under one of the
theories of free speech-the one introduced by Alexander Meik-
lejohn half a century ago-protecting free speech is the means to
achieve a public goal, which is the self-government of the people. 1
Under this instrumental view of the First Amendment, listeners have
an important interest in receiving information, but not necessarily a
49. For a feminist critique of pornography, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpre-
tation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1965).
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right.5 2 In the liberal rights-talk 3 which dominates American legal
discourse, this is an important distinction, for it means that no one has
a duty to provide listeners with information.14 The only limit imposed
on the government under this liberal view is that speakers should not
be limited. Under this rights talk, accessing information produced by
another is at most a "negative liberty," i.e., it implies only that the
government should not interfere with the activity.55
The European response, under ECHR jurisprudence, is easier
than the one given in the US. Article 10(1) of the ECHR instructs
that
[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas without interference by public authority and re-
gardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enter-
prises.1
6
Under these plain words, adults have the right to receive infor-
mation. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights ("the Court")
interpreted the term "information" to also include information and
ideas that "offend, shock or disturb. ' 57 The interpretation of the term
"information" is informed by the underlying rationale of freedom of
expression, as the Court stated:
Freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of a de-
mocratic society, one of the key requirements for progress and for
the development of every individual. Subject to paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle 10, it applies not only to "information" and "ideas" that are
viewed favourably or regarded as inoffensive or immaterial, but
also to those that are conflicting, shocking or disturbing: this is the
meaning of pluralism, tolerance and the spirit of openness, without
which there is no "democratic society.
' 58
52. In Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982), Justice Brennan recognized
"the right to receive ideas," basing this conclusion on the Meiklejohnian theory of the First
Amendment. For a theoretical discussion, see SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 35-56.
53. The term is borrowed from MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
54. As Professor Ronald Dworkin explains, the public has an important interest in receiv-
ing information, but not a "right." See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 76 (1985).
55. For the meaning of "negative liberty" vis-A-vis positive liberty, see ISAIAH BERLIN,
Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122 (1969).
56. ECHR, Art. 10(1) (emphasis added).
57. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1976). See also the
opinion of the ECHR Commission, as incorporated in the Court's judgment in Jersild v. Den-
mark, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 14 (1995) (in regard to racist speech) (quoted in Fressoz v. France,
31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2,56 (1999)).
58. Aksoy v. Turkey, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 57, 51 (2002). See also Da Silva v. Portugal, 34
Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 30 (2002).
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The right to receive information, whether we like the informa-
tion or not, and as long as it is not illegal, is thus considered to be an
inseparable part of freedom of speech. 9 The emerging European ju-
risprudence of freedom of expression focused mostly on political
speech, but the same reasoning applies to the harmful material dis-
cussed here: it is offensive to children and many adults, and it might
be shocking and disturbing, but for consenting adults it is nevertheless
"information."
We are now back to the fundamental conflict: on the one hand
we have a valid public interest in protecting children from harmful
material, and on the other hand we have an important freedom of
consenting adults to access the very same content, a freedom which
enjoys a constitutional anchor. Various mechanisms to differentiate
adults from minors are either not satisfactory (as in the case of public
libraries), or impractical (as in limiting the speakers), or partial (as in
using age verification mechanisms), or have negative unintended con-
sequences (as in imposing liability on ISPs). What then should be the
legal response in the face of a frontal conflict of this kind? This is the
question addressed in the next part.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND IN THE UK
Before considering actual examples of the attempts to control the
various links in the pornography chain, it is first necessary to outline
the scheme for protecting speech rights. The hurdles that must be
overcome to survive such scrutiny will make certain types of control
more desirable. In this section, the differences between the US,
European, and UK approaches will be examined. The constitutional
methodology is important here, for if our starting point is one that
does not value free speech as one of the most important human
rights, if not the most important one, we might slip down the slippery
slope. 6° But even those who believe it to be a fundamental human
59. Thus, in Jersild, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 25-26, where the Court interpreted the free
speech rights of a journalist, the Court stated that "the public also has a right to receive [infor-
mation and ideas]. Were it otherwise, the media would be unable to play their vital role of
'public watchdog."' See also Fressoz, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 59.
60. In fact, Dr. Etzioni argues that "free speech can be highly valued even if one ranks it
somewhat lower than it has been recently held and that children are now to be more highly
regarded." Etzioni, supra note 5, at 41. This attitude allows him to trade-off free speech with the
interest of protecting children. While we fully accept Etzioni's ultimate conclusion, we disagree
with this constitutional methodology. Categorical balancing can take place, but at the same
time, we should explain and justify the compromise of free speech rights, which in itself should
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right do not argue that it is an absolute imperative. 61 There are coun-
tervailing interests (whether just "interests" in liberal rights talk, or
"rights"), important in themselves; protecting children from harmful
material is one of them.
A. United States
The American approach is to examine the clash by way of cate-
gories: first, is the content at stake covered by the First Amend-
ment?62 If it is, the next step would inquire what sort of regulation is
at stake: is it content-based or content neutral? And if the former, is it
viewpoint neutral? 63 "Balancing" is a foreign concept in the official
methodology of American constitutional law.64 The categorical consti-
tutional methodology has the effect of channeling the complex pic-
ture of rights, freedoms, and interests into a binary juxtaposition: if
there is a First Amendment right at stake, it is almost certain to over-
come the opposite interest.65 Hence, it is surprising that Congress
opted first for a rather blunt direct regulation in order to protect chil-
dren, 66 and later for a narrower regulation,67 but nevertheless, one of
come with an acknowledgment of the "price" society pays-a moral regret-when compromis-
ing speech. This argument requires much elaboration, which we cannot conduct here. For more
on the meaning of constitutional tests and the notion of moral regret, see Lawrence G. Sager,
Some Observations About Race, Sex, and Equal Protection, 59 TUL. L. REV. 928 (1985).
61. In the US, the view that the First Amendment is an absolute has not gained support
beyond Justice Black's positions. See Hugo L. Black & Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First
Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962).
62. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1973).
63. Compare the majority's opinion in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 642-677 (concluding that the must-carry rules imposed on cable television operators are
content neutral), with Justice O'Connor's opinion, id. at 677 (concluding that the same rules are
content-based). See also Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (content neutral scheme
for issuing permits for rallies).
64. The term, though, is more complex. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). Not all constitutional systems shy away from
balancing, though. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in
a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 93-97 (2002) (President of the Israeli Supreme Court
outlining the constitutional methodology of balancing).
65. Once the examined regulation is identified as content-based, it takes a compelling state
interest to overcome it. One of the rare cases in which this has happened is Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191 (1992) (holding that a statute limiting political canvassing near polling places was
constitutional). However, in contemporary terms, this regulation will be considered content-
based, but view-point neutral.
66. Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996). The
CDA was declared unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
67. Congress next enacted the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), Pub. L. 105-227,
112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000)). COPA was subse-
quently declared unconstitutional for the purposes of granting a preliminary injunction in
ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in
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direct public-ordering. It is less of a surprise that, thus far, this direct
public-ordering approach has failed in the courts and the First
Amendment has prevailed.
B. Europe
The emerging constitutional and Human Rights jurisprudence in
Europe does not shy away from explicit balancing. 68 In fact, balancing
is a concept embedded in Article 10 of the ECHR itself. Contracting
States to the ECHR enjoy a margin of appreciation in striking the
balance, 69 but the article spells out the guidelines for doing so, though
the Court repeatedly held that this does not exclude European super-
vision.70 After outlining the contours of the right, 71 Article 10(2)
states:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restric-
tions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of in-
formation received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.7 2
This structure of the limitation allows overriding freedom of expres-
sion if, and only if, several conditions are met, and these exceptions
should be interpreted narrowly, as follows:73
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). The Third Circuit again held that COPA was unconsti-
tutional, albeit on different grounds, for purposes of granting a preliminary injunction, 322 F.3d
240 (2003), and the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to hear the case again. 124 S.
Ct. 399 (2003).
68. For an overview of European constitutionalism, see J.H.H. WEILER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999).
69. The margin might change according to the kind of speech being regulated and the goal
the restrictions aims at. Thus, for instance, when political speech is at stake, the margin is rather
narrow, whereas in the "sphere of morals," such as blasphemy, member states enjoy a wider
margin of appreciation. See, e.g., Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 30 (1997).
For elaboration on the concept of "margin of appreciation," see Handyside v. United Kingdom,
1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 754 (1976). For application in the context of Article 10(2), see Bowman v.
United Kingdom, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1998).
70. See, e.g., Wingrove, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 3.
71. ECHR, Art. 10(1).
72. ECHR, Art. 10(2) (emphasis added).
73. For the judicial instruction to interpret the exceptions narrowly, see Da Silva v. Portu-
gal, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 1 30, 33 (2000).
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Restriction of Speech: First, there is a dual preliminary condition:
that the regulated act is considered "expression," and that the regula-
tion restricts it.74 It does not matter whether the restriction is direct or
indirect. In a leading case on this issue, the European Court found
that an English statute that limited the expenditures of people who
were not standing for election, in connection with the elections, was
to be considered a "restriction."75 In another case, the Court found
that a sanction imposed after a defamatory publication took place
"hampers" the press.7 6 Closer to the subject discussed here, the Euro-
pean Commission77 found that the screening of a gay porn movie in a
back room of a sex shop was within the realm of freedom of expres-
sion.78
"Prescribed by Law": Secondly, Article 10(2) sets a formal condi-
tion: that the limitation of the right should be "prescribed by law."79
This term was interpreted to include not only statutes and constitu-
tions,80 but also unwritten law like the English Common Law.81 In any
case, the law should be formulated with sufficient clarity to enable
foreseeability. 82 Thus, when interpreting the Swiss Criminal Code's
prohibition of making or possessing obscene material-a term which
is not defined in the Swiss Code-the Court pointed to several consis-
tent decisions by Swiss courts and found them to supplement the let-
74. This is parallel to the US requirements which trigger the First Amendment-that the
speech is "covered" by the First Amendment and that the regulation abridges the First
Amendment right.
75. See Bowman, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 9-10. For a discussion of the impact of free expres-
sion rights on political funding in the United Kingdom, see Jacob Rowbottom, Political Dona-
tions and the Democratic Process: Rationales for Reform, 2002 Pub. L. 758, 771.
76. See Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407,420 (1986).
77. The ECHR initially provided a procedure for individuals to complain of breaches by
the states that are a party to it. The European Commission on Human Rights received and
investigated initial complaints of a breach of the Convention. If the dispute was not settled, a
report was provided to the state involved and the Committee of Ministers. The state concerned
or the Commission could then bring the complaint before the European Court of Human
Rights. The Commission has since been abolished and a full time court established. See A.W.
BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 417-418 (11th ed.
1993).
78. See Scherer v. Switzerland, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 276, 284-285 (1994). The Commission
subsequently concluded that the applicant's conviction for showing the film violated Article 10
of the Convention. However, the applicant died before the Court reached a decision and the
Court thus struck the case out of its list.
79. See Ek v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41 (2002), in which the Court found that the law
according to which the applicant was convicted was no longer in force, and hence was a breach
of Article 10(2).
80. See e.g., Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 67 (2002).
81. See Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 26-27 (1996) (finding that the
English Common Law of blasphemy is "law" within the meaning of Article 10(2)).
82. See id. at 26.
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ter of the Code, and thus to meet the condition of "prescribed by
law. '83 As for administrative decisions, the Court ruled that as long as
the discretion is conferred by law, and the scope of the discretion and
manner of exercise are clear, the condition is satisfied.84
Legitimate Aim: The restriction on expression must fulfill a "le-
gitimate aim." This requirement, though not explicit in the ECHR,
refers to the list of enumerated causes which allow the restriction of
freedom of expression.85 The list includes "morals," a term which was
applied in several obscenity cases, where the Court found that, given
the margin of appreciation accorded to Member States, regulation
which targets pornography aims at protecting the (public) morals, and
thus satisfies this condition.86
Proportionality: The European judiciary added one more impor-
tant condition not found in the text of Article 10(2), that of propor-
tionality: 7 the restriction on freedom of expression should be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.8 The principle of pro-
portionality is the heart of the balancing of freedom of expression
with the opposing interests. It was developed and elaborated by
European courts89 to include several prongs. Firstly, a connection be-
83. See Muller v. Switzerland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212,226 (1988).
84. Wingrove, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 26-28 (discussing the authority of the British Board of
Film Classification, which derives from the Video Recordings Act 1984).
85. See Bowman v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 10 (1998); Aksoy v. Turkey, 34
Eur. H.R. Rep. 57, 47 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Miller, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 230; Scherer v. Switzerland, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep.
276, 285-87 (1994) (Commission's position).
87. See, e.g., Bowman, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 13. For discussion of the principle of propor-
tionality in the UK, see Richard Clayton, Regaining A Sense of Proportion: The Human Rights
Act and the Proportionality Principle, 2001 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 504.
88. Bowman, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 13. The principle of proportionality has also been ap-
plied in regard to other rights which are enumerated in the ECHR. For further discussion, see
Michael Supperstone & Jason Coppel, Judicial Review After the Human Rights Act, 1999 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301, 312-13. For a thorough discussion of the principle of proportionality in
the European Community ("EC"), see TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC
LAw 89-94 (1999).
89. The principle was especially developed by the European Court of Justice (of the EC)
and the European Court of Human Rights (of the Council of Europe). For discussion of the
relationship between EC law and the ECHR, see TRIDIMAS, supra note 88, at 236-43 (explain-
ing that the EC is not formally bound by the ECHR, though the Treaty on the European Union
refers to the ECHR and commits the EU to respect basic rights, and concluding that the "two
jurisdictions are in a relationship of co-operation and not one of confrontation"). Indeed, the
Treaty reads, in Article 6(2) (formerly article F(2)): "The Union shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community Law." In
the preamble of its 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the EU reaf-
firmed its commitment to the ECHR. Article 11(1) of the Charter reads: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
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tween the restriction and the legitimate aim should be shown. This
prong requires more of a general observation: Are the means suitable
to the aim?9° Secondly, a direct connection and proportion between
the goal and the means is required: Are the means applied to achieve
the interest necessary to the restriction of freedom of expression?
This is the "necessity" prong, and the question asked is often: Are
there alternative, less restrictive means that could be applied to
achieve the same goal? Thirdly, though this is sometimes a neglected
prong, the question to be asked is: Has the measure chosen had an
excessive effect? 91
Proportionality requires examining the facts of the legislation at
stake.92 Any law that will attempt to protect children in a manner that
will restrict the freedom of expression of adults would have to pass
this barrier. It is our opinion that any restriction that limits adults'
opportunities to those that are permissible for children fails at least
the second prong: there should be less restrictive means applied. We
will return to this point later on.
C. United Kingdom
The protection of expression has not traditionally played as fun-
damental role in the UK Constitution as the First Amendment has in
the US. Traditionally, under the principle of Parliamentary sover-
eignty, the legislature is free to pass whatever laws it likes regardless
of whether it violates fundamental rights. In this sense, rights to
speech are merely residual, as people are free to say whatever they
want in so far as it is not otherwise restricted. This did not mean that
rights were ignored under the traditional approach, but rather that
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers." Article 52(3) of the Charter instructs that the meaning and scope of the rights recog-
nized in the Charter are the same as in the ECHR. See also COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: EXPLANATIONS
RELATING TO THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE CHARTER (2000).
90. See Supperstone & Coppel, supra note 88, at 313.
91. See TRIDIMAS, supra note 88, at 91-93, for a discussion of the three-part test. An ancil-
lary test looks at the reasons given by the state (or its relevant authority) for the measure it
chose to apply, and queries whether they are "relevant and sufficient." See, e.g., Worm v. Aus-
tria, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 454, 455-456 (1997); Tidende v. Norway, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16, 434
(2000). Various scholars present these three prongs in slightly different terms. See, e.g., Supper-
stone & Coppel, supra note 88, at 313-14 (defining the three prongs as "suitability," "necessity,"
and "balance").
92. For example, see the factual analysis in Jersild v. Denmark, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, TT 33-
45 (1994). Many cases in various contexts were decided on this point. See, e.g., Lingens v. Aus-
tria, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 (1986); Tidende, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16; Aksoy v. Turkey, 34 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 57 (2000); Da Silva v. Portugal, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (2000).
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they were protected by individual members of Parliament committed
to a culture of liberty who were democratically accountable. By the
early 1980s, when the political consensus broke down and the
Thatcher government was able to dominate the House of Commons,
greater concern arose that individual rights were too easily bypassed.
By this time, the ECHR had given the legal protection of rights, such
as expression, a more prominent role in the UK. In 1991, the House
of Lords recognized that ambiguous legislation should be construed
to be in conformity with the ECHR.93 However, the Lords noted that
the ECHR was not incorporated into UK law and held that there was
no presumption that a statutory discretion should be exercised in con-
formity with the ECHR.94 Consequently, while rights gained some
recognition, UK law was still nowhere near the rights talk of the US.
During this time, a similar channel of protection found favor in the
courts, in which rights were not embodied in a constitutional provi-
sion, but rather were found in the principles of the Common Law.
This meant that it was open to the legislature to restrict rights, but an
interpretive presumption existed that they would not intend to do so.
Consequently, restrictions imposed on prisoners' rights to free speech
could not be imposed using powers granted under an ambiguous or
generally worded statute.95 This seemed to go beyond the approach in
Brind, and required a presumption that discretionary powers would
be exercised in conformity with basic rights, to be displaced only
through express words or by necessary implication of an Act of Par-
liament.
A more active approach from the courts emerged as greater con-
cern arose in relation to the orthodox constitutional theory. The huge
majorities of the Thatcher and Blair governments meant Parliament
gave little chance for political channels to protect these rights, creat-
ing a dissatisfaction that led to calls for the ECHR to be incorporated
into domestic legislation. These calls were met in 1998 when the Hu-
man Rights Act ("HRA") was passed by the UK Parliament and
came into effect in October 2000. The operation of the Act is devel-
93. Brind v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept., [1991] 1 A.C. 696, 703 (1990).
94. Id. at 708-09. In Brind, the House of Lords upheld an executive order banning the
broadcast of statements of certain organizations using the actual voice of the speaker. As no
ambiguity or uncertainty existed in the statutory provision granting the Secretary of State's
power to issue the ban, the discretion conferred by that provision did not have to be exercised in
accordance with the ECHR.
95. See R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept., ex. parte. Simms, [1999] E.M.L.R. 689
(H.L.).
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oping fast, and space precludes a detailed discussion.96 By incorporat-
ing the ECHR, the scheme for protecting rights is similar to that of
the Strasbourg court outlined above.97 The Act does not adopt an
absolutist approach to speech rights, and the limitations in Article
10(2) are generic, leaving it for the courts to determine the scope and
extent of protection. 98
The HRA is designed to leave the last word on the meaning of
rights with Parliament. The courts cannot strike down legislation as
invalid, but under Section 4, they can make a declaration of incom-
patibility. The Act envisages a political pressure on the government
to change the terms of legislation in the event of a declaration, or at
least to justify the restriction. However, Section 3 places a significant
obligation on the courts to read legislation as compatible, even if this
means departing from the literal meaning of the text. The House of
Lords' decision in Regina v. A demonstrates the importance of this
power, arguably giving the court a role in re-writing legislation to
make it compatible with the ECHR.99 Such a power may be equal to,
or even greater than, the power to strike down legislation.' °°
Under Section 6 of the HRA, it is unlawful for a public authority
to act in a way incompatible with an ECHR right, unless required by
an act of Parliament. The term "public authority" clearly includes
local authorities responsible for public libraries and schools that pro-
vide Internet access.' 01 If incompatibility is found in the public author-
ity's act, the court can award whatever remedy it thinks is necessary,
as opposed to the declaration in the case of primary legislation.12 The
influence of local level public authority in drawing the balance be-
96. For an overview, see K.D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democ-
racy, 62 Mod. L. Rev. 79 (1999). For a discussion on some of the major decisions in the first two
years of the Act, see Francesca Klug & Claire O'Brien, The First Two Years of the Human
Rights Act, 2002 Pub. L 649; Keir Starmer, Two Years of the Human Rights Act, 2003 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 14.
97. See, e.g., O'Shea v. MGN, [2001] E.M.L.R. 943 (holding that a pornographic advertise-
ment was protected expression).
98. In contrast to other rights that do not have such a provision.
99. R.v.A. (No. 2), [2001] 1 A.C. 45, 67-68.
100. Of course, striking down legislation is a powerful tool, but it is a binary decision. Re-
writing legislation, on the other hand, is a creative task that goes beyond judicial review, in that
it is not just stating what the legislature can do, but de facto, replacing it.
101. See Poplar Housing & Regeneration Cmty. Assoc. Ltd. v. Donoghue, [2002] Q.B. 48, 66
(C.A. 2001) (providing that "public authority" includes persons, even private persons, perform-
ing functions of a public nature); Heather v. Leonard Cheshire Foundation, [2002] H.R.L.R. 30,
838 (C.A.).
102. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 8 (providing that "in relation to any act (or proposed
act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief
or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate.").
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tween the right and the competing aim depends on the level of defer-
ence the courts accord to the primary decision maker when applying
the proportionality standard. While accepting proportionality as more
intense than the traditional standard of review, 13 the appropriate
level of deference to be shown to the primary decision maker is still
debated. A more stringent and less deferential approach will be
granted depending on the nature of the speech in question. For ex-
ample, political speech is granted a higher level of protection than
most other types of expression. 1°4 By contrast, sexually oriented
speech would receive a much weaker standard of protection, thereby
rendering the state controls discussed in this paper more likely to
survive scrutiny. A further question of deference depends on the na-
ture of the primary decision maker. At the European level, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights applies the doctrine of margin of
appreciation, in which the court shows deference to the different cul-
tures that might result in different balances in signatory states.105
While there is no reason this should apply in the UK, a similar doc-
trine of deference may apply to show respect to the competence or
democratic legitimacy of other institutions. 1° The approach taken by
the courts to this question will determine whether the restriction of
expression on the Internet is compatible with the Act. However, un-
der the approach developing under the HRA, and following the
Strasbourg jurisprudence, attempts to prevent harmful material from
103. R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept., ex parte Daly, [2001) 2 A.C. 532, 547. For a
discussion of the standard of review before and after the Human Rights Act, see Mark Elliott,
Scrutiny of Executive Decisions Under the Human Rights Act 1998: Exactly How "Anxious"?,
2001 J.R. 166; Clayton, supra note 87, at 507.
104. R. (ProLife Alliance) v. British Broad. Corp., [2002] E.M.L.R. 41, 921-22; see also
N.W. Barber, Note, A Question of Taste, 118 L.Q. REV. 530,531 (2002).
105. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 754 (1976).
106. The deference can arise at different stages of the review, such as the consideration of
whether the subject matter precludes judicial intervention, and the determination as to whether
the limitation is unlawful. For a discussion of deference, see R. v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, ex
parte Kebilene, [2000] 2 A.C. 326, 380-81; R. (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State
for Transport the Environment and the Regions, [2003] 2 A.C. 295, 320-22 (2001); Brown v. Stott,
[2003] 1 A.C. 681, 694-95, 703 (P.C. 2000); R. v. Lambert, [2002] 2 A.C. 545, 623 (2001); and R.
v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept., [2001] 2 AC 532, 535-36. For a discussion of the case law,
see Paul Craig, The Courts, The Human Rights Act and Judicial Review, 117 L.Q. REV. 589
(2001); Richard A. Edwards, Judicial Deference Under the Human Rights Act, 65 MOD. L. REV.
859 (2002); Ian Leigh, Taking Rights Proportionately: Judicial Review, the Human Rights Act
and Strasbourg, 2002 PUB. L 265; Nicholas Blake, Importing Proportionality: Clarification or
Confusion, 2002 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV 19. The approach has been criticized for lacking a
coherent principle and that the courts have acted pragmatically. For example, Richard Edwards
argues that the courts should not shy away from morally complex decisions as the purpose of the
Human Rights Act is to create a culture of justification from the decision making bodies and
that deference should not simply grant a license to the legislatures. See Edwards, supra, at 878.
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being accessed on the Internet by children are less likely to fall foul of
the courts than in the US, even if they entail some degree of overspill
into the protected speech of adults. The way in which the courts ap-
proach this issue will be examined in the next section.
III. LEGAL RESPONSES AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
A. The Various Kinds of Regulation
Regulation of expression is a tricky task. Almost any interference
in the "marketplace of ideas" has a negative effect on the free expres-
sion rights of some participants in the market. Hence, direct regula-
tion, which interrupts "normal" market behavior and rules out some
of the activities going on within it, needs to pass a rather high thresh-
old. But there are other narrowly tailored, less intrusive ways to
achieve more of the public interest while causing less harm on the
free speech side. For example, opting for a shift in the regulatory
mode-from a direct public-ordering approach to an indirect public-
ordering approach-is one such way. Instead of the government ex-
plicitly declaring which activities are allowed and which are prohib-
ited, the government creates a mechanism that provides the players
within the market with incentives to reevaluate their behavior, and
adapt it toward the public interest. They are not obliged to comply,
but are encouraged to do so.
Yet another way is even less intrusive, and it is one which leaves
the market (or field, for those who prefer a less capitalistic metaphor)
entirely in the hands of the players: if they wish, they can undertake
self-regulation. The motivation to do so might be the players' own
sense of responsibility, or their commercial fear of the market's reac-
tion, or the political fear that if they stay idle, government will even-
tually interfere. This is an approach of private-ordering.
The legal experience thus far in the area of protecting children
has provided us with examples of all three possible avenues and vari-
ous combinations thereof. The US first attempted a direct public-
ordering approach and, later, an indirect one, whereas the European
way tended from the very start towards a private-ordering approach.
The kinds of regulation described above will generally focus on dif-
ferent stages of the pornography chain.1° Direct controls on content,
107. See supra Part I.A.
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in aiming to suppress the dissemination of material, will be most ef-
fective against the producer/speaker (the first link of the pornography
chain). Indirect public-ordering and private-ordering are similar in
that they attempt to create self-regulatory, flexible, or individualized
controls, and will often be targeted at the later links of the chain, such
as the ISP, facility, or user. These later stages allow for greater varia-
tion in regulation according to the potential recipient, whereas target-
ing the producer of material will result in a uniform restriction of the
material.
At first sight, then, the different regulatory strategies might seem
to parallel the links in the chain of pornography; direct public-
ordering aims at the producer of the material, whereas indirect pub-
lic-ordering and private-ordering aim at other links in the chain.
However, the parallel between strategy and link is not inevitable. For
example, restraints on content may be applied against not only the
producer, but also the individual user or library to prevent the
downloading of unlawful material. The discussion below will illustrate
that the parallel is kept in place by problems of enforcing such re-
straints at the lower levels.' °8
B. Direct Public-Ordering
Direct public-ordering poses the greatest difficulty in terms of
free expression, in that it is a state intervention that rules out certain
types of activities. The approach taken may be to prohibit certain
activities or types of speech, thereby rendering speech that was previ-
ously thought of as harmful to be unlawful. The methods and prob-
lems of this type of control have been discussed in relation to the
illegal/harmful distinction above. For such reasons, direct public-
ordering is the bluntest method and has the greatest incidental im-
pact. An example of this would arise if a country within Europe at-
tempted to pass its own version of the American Communications
Decency Act ("CDA") or the Child Online Protection Act
("COPA"). The question therefore arises as to whether this legisla-
tion would survive the ECHR or domestic protection of rights. It
seems that the production of the material would be considered "ex-
pression," and that such a measure restricts it. In order to survive, the
"Europeanized CDA" would have to be prescribed in a law, or at
108. Enforcing content restraints on individual users, while possible, would require exten-
sive policing in order to suppress the material. It is likely to be found only in combination with
attempts to retrain the higher levels of the pornography chain.
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least an anchor in a law, that outlines the contours of discretion of an
administrative body, and it would have to address the definitions of
the prescribed material in as clear of a manner as possible. Such legis-
lation would be likely to be considered as furthering a legitimate aim,
and "necessary in a democratic society." The focus would be on the
proportionality of such a measure, and especially, we anticipate the
question to be whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the
legitimate goal without impacting the freedoms of adults. Etzioni's
proposal to adopt an adult-child separation approach, i.e., allocating
separate computers to children and adults in public libraries, perfectly
fits this test. This would be a completely different way of looking at
things, compared to the US; the legislation is not thought of in terms
of one legal regime (i.e., the First Amendment), but rather as a bal-
ance between the competing social interests of protecting free speech
and protecting children. At the end of the day, the details of each
legislation will determine its fate.
Direct measures that proscribe expression harmful to children
have already reached the European Court, for example in Handyside,
a pre-Internet case. In that case, the publishers of The Little Red
Schoolbook claimed that their expression rights were infringed by the
seizure of books and prosecution under the UK Obscene Publications
Acts. The book contained a twenty-six-page section on sex, including
such topics as masturbation, pornography, venereal disease, and abor-
tion-subjects that would not be thought of as harmful to an adult
reader. Although the book was distributed through ordinary chan-
nels, it was aimed at school children age twelve and older. The Euro-
pean Court held the protection of morals and of young people to be a
legitimate aim under Article 10(2).109
The Court placed importance on the fact that the book was
aimed at young persons and had a factual style that would be easily
understandable, even by readers younger than the targeted group,
and that the book was to be distributed widely.110 The Court stated
that this case was not analogous to pornographic publications, sex
shops, and adult entertainers that might be exposed to young people
in some circumstances, because the Little Red Book was aimed at and
easily accessible to young people.' Consequently, on the necessity of
the measures, the Court in Handyside rejected the argument that a
109. Handyside, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 753, 755.




restriction on the sale of the book (for example, to adults only) would
suffice, 112 as there was no sense in restricting to adults the sale of a
work destined for the young."1 3
As noted in earlier sections, similar considerations apply to the
Internet where minors can easily access material aimed at adults, es-
pecially if a password or a fee is not required. Such an approach has
been followed in relation to the Internet in Perrin, where the UK
Court of Appeal rejected the argument that self-regulation or block-
ing software was the only proportionate way to pursue the aim of
protecting children.114 The restriction of content at the source may be
suitable where the material is aimed at or easily accessed by minors.
However, where the harmful material is produced with adults as the
intended consumers and is not targeted to minors, a direct restriction
that limits adult access is more likely to fall foul of the ECHR. The
possibility of restricting access to such sites may be thought sufficient
to protect children when the material is aimed at adults and access by
minors is incidental.
It is interesting to note that the approach in Handyside balanced
the adult's right to produce and impart expression with the interest in
protecting the child's welfare. Even though children contributed to
The Little Red Book, the rights of children to produce and receive
information were not considered.'15 An approach based on the child's
right to produce would have similarities with Etzioni's distinction
between the First Amendment rights of children and teenagers, al-
though it remains unclear whether such a framework would have
made a difference to the outcome of the case." 6 Handyside demon-
strates that in some circumstances, the ECHR permits direct re-
112. Id.
113. Id. at 759.
114. R. v. Perrin, [2002] EWCA Crim. 747 (C.A.). In Perrin, the Court noted that impact on
freedom of expression was limited, as the prosecution had only been successful in relation to a
trailer that did not require a password or credit card details. The jury did not convict on material
that was accessible only through membership. See id. at 50.
115. Fortin, supra note 13, at 353.
116. Geraldine Van Bueren argues that if the action was framed in terms of an older child's
right to receive information, the Court may have considered the total prohibition of the book as
disproportionate to the aim, thereby focusing more on proportionality than margin of apprecia-
tion. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
135 (1995). Ursula Kilkelly notes that the Commission on Human Rights dismissed a complaint
brought by a mother and her thirteen- and seventeen-year-old children, alleging that the ban
infringed their right to receive information. However, the application failed as a second, modi-
fied, edition of the book was freely available. URSULA KILKELLY, THE CHILD AND THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 131 (1999).
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straints on adults' expression rights in relation to materials that would
not harm adults in order to protect children.
This jurisprudence appears to leave open the option of suppress-
ing material on the Internet in some circumstances to protect the wel-
fare of children without falling foul of the ECHR. Given this, it may
come as a surprise that the principal means of combating harmful
material in Europe has not been through direct restrictions on per-
missible content. One reason may be that European countries have
benefited from the American experience of the CDA and do not
want to be vulnerable to such challenges. Another factor is the sheer
difficulty in enforcing such laws.
Several problems have already emerged when attempting to en-
force the Obscene Publications Act in the UK in relation to the
Internet. Initial uncertainty over the applicability of the law to the
Internet was resolved in 1994, when the Act was amended to include
data stored on a computer disc as an "article,"" 7 and covered the
transmission of data as publication. However, even if the Act does
apply to the Internet, the problem remains in deciding whom to
prosecute. The global nature of the Internet means obscene material
can be downloaded from sites outside the UK. The legal response has
been to take a broad interpretation of the Act and define "publica-
tion" as occurring when the information is downloaded in the UK, as
the electronic data stored overseas is transmitted into the UK." 8 As a
117. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c.33, Sched 9 3. For a discussion of these
issues, see Colin Manchester, Computer Pornography, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 546, 548-52. The Act
has been applied to activity on the Internet on a few occasions, mainly in relation to hardcore
pornography that is corrupting to adults. See Akdeniz & Strossen, supra note 38, at 210 (refer-
ring to R. v. Jack (Colin Mason), Norwich C.C., 4 July 1994).
118. In R. v. Waddon, [2000] All E.R. 502, a businessman was prosecuted even though the
websites concerned were based in the US. The materials were, however, prepared and uploaded
to the website in the UK. The Court of Appeal suggested that publication can occur when
images are downloaded from a foreign website. Rose, L.J., stated,
As it seems to us, there can be publication on a Web site abroad, when images are
there uploaded; and there can be further publication when those images are
downloaded elsewhere. That approach is, as it seems to us, underlined by the provi-
sions of s.1(3)(b) as to what is capable of giving rise to publication where matter has
been electronically transmitted.
Id. at 12. That approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Perrin, [2002] E.W.C.A.
Crim 747, in which a man was prosecuted for publishing an obscene article when the material
was prepared and uploaded abroad into a foreign website. The Court rejected a parallel with
ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), given the difference in constitutional protection and rela-
tions between the states, and decided there was no need to show that major steps in relation to
publication were taken within the jurisdiction of the court. The Court of Appeal held that the
images were published in England when downloaded by the police in the UK. For a criticism of
the decision in Perrin, see Michael Hirst, Cyberobscenity and the Ambit of English Criminal
Law, 13 CoMP. & L. 25, 28 (2002).
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consequence, producers of obscene content based overseas can be
liable in the UK for publishing materials that are downloaded in the
UK. This does not, however, resolve the problem of enforcing this
provision where the publisher remains based overseas. Consequently,
strategies seeking the cooperation of those at every stage in the chain
have more chance of being effective and practically implemented,
even if direct ordering may be constitutionally permitted.
C. Indirect Public-Ordering
A less restrictive measure to achieve the goal of protecting chil-
dren from harmful material is to offer a set of incentives to various
players in the field: if they act in a certain manner, they will enjoy
some benefits, and if they behave in a different manner, they might
suffer some losses. In the digital environment, the prominent example
of such a regulatory approach is the liability of Internet Service Pro-
viders ("ISP") for third-party content. 1 9
There are various kinds of ISPs. Some offer only access to the
Internet and, in this respect, are similar to telephone companies
("common carriers"). Others offer content produced by users, such as
web sites which allow the posting of comments, including links and
files. These are either supervised or unsupervised, and operate either
synchronically (chat rooms) or a-synchronically ("forums" or bulletin
boards). Accordingly, the services offered range from a mere plat-
form to a more active role. Yet other services offer location tools,
such as search engines or indexes, or technology which enables users
to communicate directly, such as Instant Messaging or peer-to-peer
systems like Kazaa.
Imposing liability on ISPs seems, at least at first, to be a reason-
able measure; if aiming at the speakers might limit their freedom of
expression, why not aim at another link in the chain, which is, in many
cases, also a technological bottleneck, since much of the communica-
tion passes through its services. Since it is not the ISPs who produce
the speech, the argument continues, imposing liability does not raise
119. The discussion that follows does not purport to be exhaustive. There is abundant litera-
ture on this topic. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 901 (2002). The problem has arisen in the context of copyright infringement by third
parties, with some similar considerations. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social
Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin
Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 372-380 (1995); Alfred C. Yen, Internet
Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the
First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1840-44 (2000).
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any particular free-expression difficulties. The latter argument de-
pends, of course, on the kind of service imposed: a common carrier or
a search engine does not have a free expression interest in the com-
munication it carries or points to, just like the telephone company
does not have such an interest in the communication of the users, but
a web site that offers editorial services might have such an interest,
and thus its freedom of expression will be triggered. However, given
the application of Article 10 discussed above, and the more limited
nature of the restraint here, a challenge asserting the expression
rights of the ISP seems less likely to succeed.
Imposing liability on ISPs would cause them to undertake meas-
ures to avoid the risk of liability. An ISP may adopt a reviewing pro-
cedure to evaluate the material users wish to post on-line, either
before the message is posted, or to adopt a "take down" policy, where
the ISP reviews the material after it is posted, and then deletes what-
ever it believes is harmful (or for that matter, any illegal material).
Another possible policy would be to "take down" content only after a
specific complaint is made ("notice"), accompanied with a procedure
to inform the person who posted the material in the first place. These
policies can be accompanied with specific terms embodied in the con-
tract between the ISP and the user.
It is easy to see that this system is much more attractive than di-
rect public-ordering. However, it also has quite a few apparent unin-
tended consequences. Firstly, it imposes costs on ISPs. Establishing
and operating a "notice and take down" policy, for example, requires
substantial amounts of money, and a review mechanism requires even
higher amounts. There is also a question of the technological possibil-
ity: can there be a meaningful review process in a system where mil-
lions of messages are exchanged every minute? If we do impose
liability, the result would be that fewer operators will be able to un-
dertake their operations. This would result in concentration of owner-
ship, 120 impediment to competition, and raising prices. The users,
needless to say, would be those who would eventually bear the costs.
Secondly, since the ISP would naturally wish to avoid liability, it
would have to make decisions regarding the legality of the content.
This task is almost impossible, given the global nature of the Internet:
120. This concentration of private power might later on become attractive for the state, for
example, in pursuing its battle against terror. This raises another host of questions. For discus-
sion, see Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence
of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming) (on file with authors).
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what is legal in one place might be illegal elsewhere.121 Such liability
will cause ISPs to remove any material about which a complaint is
made, even where the complaint lacks merit.122 Hence, we can expect
that the ISP will act in a censorial spirit; whenever there would be a
doubt as to whether some material is harmful to children, the ISP
would be quick to click on the "delete" key. In other words, imposing
liability on ISPs results in a chilling effect on the ISPs, and it would
affect quite immediately the rights of users-the potential speakers
and receivers of information.123
The fact that the legal environment would now be that of private
law-the question being whether the ISP violated the contract with
the user-further limits the rights of users. The ISP is not obliged to
provide service; it is not accountable and does not have to explain its
decision (especially in light of the broad disclaimers which are often
included in "terms of use" contracts). In other words, replacing direct
public-ordering with indirect public-ordering has the effect of privat-
izing the enforcement of the protection of freedom of expression, in a
manner that expression is likely to lose. A challenge by a user would
be dependent on some horizontal effect of the rights.124
Thirdly, in light of rules of liability, some ISPs might be drawn to
change their business model: they will reduce their involvement and
strive to offer less editorial services and more of a "common carrier"
service. Liability will actively discourage ISPs from taking responsibil-
ity, and attempting to monitor content, as ignorance could act as a
121. The Yahoo! controversy in France is a clear example. Whereas trading Nazi memora-
bilia is illegal in France, it is "covered" by the First Amendment. This did not deter a French
court from ruling that the French subsidiary of the American Yahoo! is bound by French law
when operating in France. See LICRA (League Against Racism and Antisemitism) v. Yahoo!
Inc., (County Court, Paris, Nov. 20, 2000), available at
http:llwww.cdt.orglspeechinternational/O0ll2Oyahoo.france.pdf. Following this decision, an
American court declared the French ruling to be unenforceable in the US. See Yahoo!, Inc. v.
La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
122. See Press Release, Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK), U.K. ISP Found Liable for
Defamation, http://www.cyber-rights.org/press/1999.htm (Mar. 26, 1999); Yaman Akdeniz, Case
Analysis of Laurence Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited, 1999 J. Civ. LIBERTIES 260, 260-67,
available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/reports/demon.htm; Kit Burden, Damned for Defama-
tion, 15 CoMP. L. & SECURITY REP. 260 (1999); Lillian Edwards, Defamation and the Internet,
in LAW AND THE INTERNET: A FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 14, at
267.
123. This seems to be the main consideration which led the U.S. Congress to accord ISPs
strong immunity in many situations. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2000); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997).
124. Space precludes a detailed discussion, but in the context of the UK Human Rights Act,
see Murray Hunt, The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act, 1998 PUB. L. 423; Richard
Buxton, The Human Rights Act and Private Law, 116 L.Q. REV. 48 (2000); H.W.R. Wade,
Horizons of Horizontality, 116 L.Q. REv. 217 (2000).
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shield for liability. 2' If this is the effect, then society loses twice: it has
less valuable services to choose from and the content is not reviewed
by anyone. Thus, the harmful material will find its way to the "mar-
ket."
After some experiments, the European Community opted for a
rather general structure of liability imposed on ISPs. Before we look
into this scheme, it might be a good idea to look at a couple of prior
events. One is the Somm case in Germany, the other being the Eng-
lish case of Godfrey v. Demon.
The Somm case illustrates some of the difficulties of imposing li-
ability on ISPs.2 6 Felix Somm was the chief executive of CompuServe,
Germany, a subsidiary of CompuServe USA. The German company
provided access services to the Internet, including access to material
stored on the servers of the American company. Some users posted
material such as child pornography, bestiality, and violent games on
various Usenets. The distribution of these was illegal in Germany
(and probably in other jurisdictions as well). 127 In 1995, the German
police acted and informed Somm of the illegal material. Immediately
thereafter, CompuServe blocked access to all Usenet newsgroups, all
over the world. 28 That was an unprecedented response (which has
apparently not since repeated itself). The access remained blocked for
two months.
Somm was charged and, in May 1998, convicted by the Munich
Local Court of assisting the dissemination of material harmful to mi-
nors.129 The case raises many interesting and important issues, such as
conflict of laws and choice of law, but for the current purpose we
should note the ability of Somm to control the material and delete it:
he had no such control, since the material was stored on servers
owned by another company (though not a stranger to the German
subsidiary) in another country. All Somm did was to provide access.
125. See Andrew Joint, Paedophiles and Their Use of Online Chat Facilities, 152 NEW L.J.
1602, 1602 (2002).
126. See People v. Somm, Amtsgericht, File No. 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95 (1998) (English
translation by Christopher Kuner available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/isps/somm-dec.htm
(Sept. 1998)).
127. Thus, for example, the German Federal Review Board listed the games at stake as
morally harmful to minors. See id. at § 11.2.
128. See Mark Konkel, Comment, Internet Indecency, International Censorship, and Service
Providers' Liability, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COmp. L. 453, 454-55 (2000). The number of
users affected was reported to be as high as 4.3 million. See MARGARET JANE RADIN ET AL.,
INTERNET COMMERCE: THE EMERGING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1058 (2002).
129. See Somm, supra note 126.
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Even if Somm did have the technical ability, what should he have
done, given that 99 percent of the material available in the Usenets
was legal? 30 Furthermore, it is quite likely that some of the material
was illegal in Germany but legal elsewhere (we can assume that at
least the games were legal in the US).
The events that accompanied the case were no less interesting.
The German legislature amended the relevant statutes so as to clarify
that ISPs are immune from liability for third-party content, and the
prosecutors changed their minds. They themselves appealed the con-
viction, and in 1999, the appellate court acquitted Somm.131
Although the case dealt with illegal material, it illustrates the dif-
ficulties of imposing liability on ISPs. Not all ISPs are technical bot-
tlenecks. In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the
legal from the illegal. Furthermore, the potential liability has a "freez-
ing" effect on speech. The difficulty to identify the unwanted content
is even more acute when the legality turns not only on the content,
but on the user-that is, whether she is an adult or a minor.
In the English case of Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd.,'32 the ISP
(Demon) offered a Usenet service in which users' postings were
stored for two weeks. An unknown person made an obscene and de-
famatory posting purporting to be written by Godfrey. Godfrey in-
formed Demon that the posting was a forgery and requested that it be
removed. Demon failed to do this, and the message remained until its
expiry. The libel proceedings subsequently brought by Godfrey tested
the issue of ISP liability in the UK. Under the Common Law stan-
dard, Mr. Justice Morland held that Demon was the publisher and
that the transmission of such a posting from the service provider to
any person accessing it was publication:
the defendants, whenever they transmit and whenever there is
transmitted from the storage of their news server a defamatory
posting, publish that posting to any subscriber to their ISP who ac-
cesses the newsgroup containing that posting.
13
Demon was not just the mere passive conduit of information, but
chose to receive the postings, to store them, to make them available
to users, and could have removed them. Demon's defense of "inno-
cent dissemination" under Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act of
130. See Somm, supra note 126, at § V.
131. For a discussion of these events, see Konkel, supra note 128, at 463-65.
132. [2001] Q.B. 201.
133. Id. at 208-09.
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1996 was rejected as Demon had been given notice of the posting by
Godfrey.13 4 The effect of the decision is to require ISPs providing that
type of service to remove the material once they acquire knowledge
of the unlawful content.
This approach indeed fits the requirements of the EC E-
Commerce Directive135 that was implemented in the UK in August
2002.136 Unlike the US, which has two separate legal regimes that gov-
ern liability of ISPs-one in regard to copyright law and one for all
other kinds of content-the European Directive determines a unified
system.'37 The European regime differentiates between the kinds of
service provided. Firstly, it assures immunity to ISPs who are mere
conduits. Article 12 sets a few conditions which ensure that the ISP is
indeed a conduit and is not involved in initiating or editing the mes-
sage transmitted, or editing it, and does not determine the parties of
the transmission.1 38 Secondly, it provides the ISP with immunity for
caching, i.e., automatic, intermediate, and temporary storage. Caching
is a vital technological step for transmission of information under the
current architecture of the Internet, in that it eases the traffic over the
Internet and enables a rather quick and accurate transmission.3 9 This
immunity is subject to the ISP not interfering with the transmissions,
and to its removal of material upon requiring knowledge that the
original material is no longer available. Thirdly, the Directive re-
quires that ISPs be awarded immunity for content stored on their
servers by users.14 This immunity is subject to lack of knowledge on
134. Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act, 1996, c.31, provides:
In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he shows that-
(a) he was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement complained of,
(b) he took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and
(c) he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or con-
tributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.
135. See Council Directive 2000/311EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Informa-
tion Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L
178) 1-16 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive].
136. See id.; Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, No 2013; Graham
Smith & Alex Hand, Implementing the E-Commerce Directive, 152 NEW L.J. INFO. TECH.
SUPPLEMENT 1597, 1597-99 (2002). Under European Community law, a directive requires the
Member States to adopt their local law so as to comply with the general principles enumerated
in the Directive.
137. The liability of ISPs for copyright infringement is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000), and
for any other content, in 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000), notwithstanding the effect of criminal law,
intellectual property law, state law, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. See
47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2000).
138. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 135, Art. 12. Article 12 further clarifies that it refers
to "automatic, intermediate and transient storage of information."
139. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 135, Art. 13.
140. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 135, Art. 14.
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behalf of the ISP, and to the condition that once such knowledge is
acquired, the content is removed. This is usually referred to as the
"notice and take-down" principle. Whether an ISP can be deemed to
have such constructive knowledge will depend on the circumstances;
it may in some cases be blatantly obvious from the name of the Use-
net group that it is to be used for obscenity or defamatory purposes.1 41
Finally, the Directive requires that "Member States shall not impose
a general obligation on providers.., to monitor the information
which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. ' 14
2
This is not a perfect system either, and it does impose costs on
the ISPs, as well as risks. If the ISPs, upon receiving a notice of harm-
ful content, take it down, and it later turns out that the material was
perfectly legal, they face the risk of being sued by the user who posted
the content at stake.1 43 In the UK, the police had initially considered
pursuing ISPs to combat the problems of pornography.144 However, a
balance seems to have been struck between increasing the expense of
monitoring and risking liability, since now the Internet Watch Foun-
dation ("IWF") notifies the ISPs of any unlawful material, and the
ISP can then take the necessary steps to avoid liability.1 45
The overall result is one of a careful regulation that adopts an in-
direct public-ordering approach. It provides the ISPs with an option
to choose immunity, so as not to act in a censorial mode, and thus
protects both the ISPs' commercial and proprietary interests and,
more importantly, does not interfere with the "marketplace of ideas"
since the users are not affected. But, unlike the US regime regarding
defamation, violations of privacy, or even negligence to remove child
pornography,146 this immunity is not absolute. Upon notice, the ISP
141. Gavin Sutter, 'Nothing New Under the Sun': Old Fears and New Media, 8 INT'L J.L. &
INFO. TECH. 338, 365-66 (2000).
142. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 134, Art. 15.
143. See Reuters' Report, Europe's ISPs Overrun with Website Take-Down Orders (Dec. 11,
2002), available at http://www.ispa.org.uk/html/media/coverage.html.
144. See Sutter, supra note 141, at 368-70.
145. The Internet Watch Foundation ("IWF") is one of the means of private ordering,
which we discuss infra, text accompanying note 214. This is a clear example of the mixed Euro-
pean approach, of combining an indirect public ordering approach (rules pertaining to ISP
liability) and private action (the IWF).
146. This is the immunity provided under 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). In one horrifying case, the
Florida Supreme Court found that an ISP enjoyed immunity, despite its refusal to take down
advertisements for the sale of videotapes and photographs posted in chat rooms depicting the
rape of an 11-year-old child. The child's mother sued the ISP for negligently failing to act to
remove the messages. The majority found the ISP to enjoy immunity, over the dissent of Justice
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must act. In this manner, the cost imposed on it is minimized; it is
cheaper to establish a system to receive notices and act upon their
receipt than to build and maintain a monitoring system. The pro-
tected interest (privacy, reputation, etc.) is protected. The ISP need
not act accordingly, and then it might risk a suit, in which it will be
able to litigate the issue and raise "regular" defenses under the rele-
vant cause of action.
Another form of public-ordering operates through the kind of
policies at libraries and other areas where the public can access the
Internet. In the UK, public libraries are run by local authorities (or
library authorities) and have a duty "to provide a comprehensive and
efficient library service for all persons desiring to make use
thereof."1 47 However, this duty does not extend to stocking pornogra-
phy. Some materials stocked may be suitable for adults but deemed
harmful to children. In this case, a restriction to prevent offense or
any other harm being caused by stocked materials may not be out of
step with the past practices of some libraries. In the past, libraries
have been reported to have taken controversial books off the shelves
but made them available upon request, for example with The Satanic
Verses.148 The problem discussed in this paper is distinct in that it is
not practicable to request permission for access to every web site. The
closest control is to provide filtering software or a system of ratings
and to require permission before the software is to be disabled, which
will be discussed below. Such measures would also raise the issues of
privacy and the chilling effect considered by Etzioni.
D. Private-Ordering
A third regulatory regime avoids any public interference with the
market, including the pornography chain. It leaves the regulation to
the market. Obviously, this approach might not satisfy many. In the
absence of regulation, some players will do nothing to prevent the
distribution of harmful material, as well as illegal material, or chil-
dren's access thereto. But quite a few will opt for this approach on
Lewis. See Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) (applying Zeran v. Am. Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997)).
147. Public Libraries and Museums Act, 1964, c.75, § 7(1). While this service is provided by
local authorities, the Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport superintends the system
under Section 1. If a complaint is made that a library authority has failed to fulfill its duty, then
the Secretary of State can hold an enquiry on the matter, after which an order declaring it in
default and directing it to carry out its duties can be made.
148. Nicolette Jones, For Your Eyes Only?, TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 1999, at 36.
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their own initiative, and the stronger players in the market are more
likely to do so. The reason is simple: it is good for their business.
149
The ISPs, like any player in the market, prefer to take care of their
own business and avoid external interference. ISPs know that in the
absence of a serious effort on their behalf, the legislature or the
courts are likely to fill the vacuum. In addition, the ISPs are inter-
ested (or should be interested) in providing a better service to their
clients. If clients demand a "clean" environment, the wise ISP will do
its best to supply it. A refusal of an ISP, for instance, to remove child
pornography from its servers and block access to it might result in a
public relations disaster. 150 Furthermore, as long as the legal climate is
uncertain, ISPs fear they might be found jointly liable for the illegal
acts of third parties.
Private-ordering can take many forms. Establishing a clear
method of communication of users to the ISP for complaints of harm-
ful or illegal material, i.e., a "notice" system, followed by a "take-
down" policy, is one example. 5' Adopting a clear code of conduct
aimed at both the employees and the users, accompanied with sanc-
tions, is another way. The "terms of use" can embody this code of
conduct, and if formalities are met, they can be designed as a valid
and enforceable contract. The contract can determine, for example,
that a user who posts harmful material will be disconnected and his or
her service terminated. The contract can further include a disclaimer
that will immunize the ISP from breach of contract if it terminates an
account in such circumstances. Another mechanism is one of labeling,
or rating, which we will discuss shortly.
Private-ordering, or self-regulation, can also make use of tech-
nology. There are some technologies, and we are likely to see more in
the future, that purport to "take care" of some of the concerns dis-
cussed here. Age-verification technologies, discussed earlier, are one
example. 152 Filtering software is another interesting technology which
we examine.
Self-regulation need not be left all to its own. Government can
provide "background rules" either in the form of direct requirements
(in which case it is no longer self-regulation), or a sanction for misrep-
149. Obviously, there might be other reasons as well, such as the moral views of the share-
holders and executives of the ISPs.
150. See, e.g., the sad case of Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d at 1010.
151. See supra text accompanying note 140.
152. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); supra, text accompanying note 19.
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resentation, 153 in which case it is better to view this as an indirect pub-
lic-ordering. But government can have an active role in supporting
self-regulation, without direct or indirect interference. This is the
European way thus far.
We begin by surveying the rating system and the filtering soft-
ware, and then turn to survey the European measures undertaken
thus far.
1. Ratings
The Platform for Internet Content Selection ("PICS") provides a
technological method for rating the content of web sites. PICS is an
industry standard that allows labels to be attached to web materials
that can be read by a computer receiving the information. The tech-
nology differs from a filtering system which blocks sites that contain
certain keywords.1 14 Instead, PICS recognizes a predetermined label
for the material. It has been used to develop ratings systems in which
pages are given a label describing the content. Much depends on
which system is used. Initial ratings were developed by the Recrea-
tional Software Advisory Council ("RSACi"), and its successor was
launched in December 2000 by the Internet Content Rating Associa-
tion ("ICRA").'55 This system is the most prominent and is built into
both Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator. The system places
material into categories, including language, nudity, sex, and violence.
The producers of the web pages then provide details of the content of
their material in accordance with these categories.
The PICS standard was devised to create a means for material to
be rated by content providers and by third parties for use by parents
and teachers.156 It allows the users to choose what sort of content they
would like to see, and allows sites to be blocked according to those
preferences. For example, if a viewer wishes to view violence but not
nudity, then the software can be set in such a way. Those developing
PICS recognized that a diversity of standards exists among Internet
users and that access should be provided to a wide range of ratings
153. Compare to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's power to prevent the use of "unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce." Seel5 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
154. Harry Hochheiser, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Filtering FAQ,
http://www.cpsr.org/filters/faq.html#3.1 (Apr. 6, 2001).
155. See Internet Content Ratings Association, http://www.icra.org/.
156. World Wide Web Consortium, PICS Statement of Principles, http://www.w3.org/PICS/
principles, html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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products.157 In theory, PICS allows a method of preventing access to
harmful material, but in a manner that is not imposed from a central-
ized source unrepresentative of any views as to what is harmful and
what is not.
In practice, PICS raises some difficulties similar to filtering,
which we will discuss shortly. PICS has been criticized, as one or two
ratings systems dominate the market and create a uniform method of
rating content that is built into Internet software. 1 8 Most users are
likely to use whatever software comes with the browser, thereby un-
dermining the commitment to diversity that is cited as one of PICS'
strengths. Not every producer of material has the expertise or re-
sources to provide a rating. However, some of the filtering software
will automatically prevent access to sites that are unrated. Web con-
tent that goes unrated will thereby be harder to access, unless the user
has the knowledge to remove the ratings software. 9 Consequently,
large corporate sites that have the support and resources to self-rate
may dominate the Internet. In addition, fears exist that rating will
become the first step on a path to greater regulation-that when the
software is found not to fulfill the high expectations of preventing
access to harmful content, as seems inevitable, calls will be made for
more direct censorship.16 Furthermore, critics argue that it is impos-
sible for all types of speech to neatly fall into the categories of rat-
ing.161 If a website about sexually transmitted diseases is labeled as
sexual content, then it may be placed out of the reach of younger us-
ers. The last concern, but not the least, is who determines the stan-
dards. PICS envisions that software companies or website operators
determine the rating. But these companies, benevolent as their moti-
vations might be, are unelected and are not accountable. If PICS suc-
ceeds, the result is that the public has delegated its power to make
moral judgments to technology designed by for-profit corporations.
2. Filtering Software
Filtering software purports to identify the content of on-line ma-
terial and, accordingly, separate the "good" from the "bad." At the
157. World Wide Web Consortium, Statement of the Intent and Use of PICS: Using PICS
Well, http://www.w3.org/TR/NOTE-PICS-Statement (June 1, 1998).
158. American Civil Liberties Union, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning?,
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heart of the software lie lists of URLs,162 and IP addresses, 163 or an
algorithm that reflects the choices and decisions of the code's design-
ers. Today there are several commercial products available on the
market, at an average annual cost of less than a $100. The software
can be installed at various points, either on the user's computer or the
ISP's servers. The technology aims at breaking the pornography chain
just before it arrives at its destination: the minor user. The software,
once installed, is supposed to block access to sites and other content it
recognizes as harmful.
How is the algorithm composed? The various corporations en-
gaging in this field adopt various methods.164 Some employ parents
who simply check websites and label them according to their content
and according to the corporation's criteria; the label is then used to
classify the website into "white lists" and "black lists." The algorithm
reflects the lists. A second method is based on the software "reading"
the web site, access to which is requested by the user. If the software
identifies certain words (in the URL (the web address), the meta-tags,
or the body of the website) such as "sex," it will block access. A third
method is more sophisticated and is based on as many features as
possible of pornographic web sites, such as the size of the letters, in-
ternal and external links, colors, text, etc. These are combined into a
complex algorithm. 165 Of course, the various methods can be used in
conjunction with each other.166
What are the exact criteria that guide each software-producer?
The designers maintain this as a secret, or to be more precise, a trade
secret. 167 This is not just a peculiar feature of intellectual property law.
162. A URL is a "Uniform Resource Locator," which is the "web address" of a web site,
either numerically (the IP address) or a textual domain name. See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v.
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 417 (2002).
163. For an analysis of the limits of IP-based filtering software, see Benjamin Edelman,
Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School, Web Sites Sharing IP Ad-
dresses: Prevalence and Significance, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/ip-sharing/
(last updated Sept. 12, 2003).
164. For discussion of some of these methods, see Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d
at 427-36.
165. See iCognito, Technology Overview, http://www.puresight.com/technology/about.shtml
(last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
166. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 427-36.
167. Trade secret law allows reverse engineering of the product, to reveal its "secret." How-
ever, reverse engineering of software inevitably requires its temporary copying. One US court
found such a copying which was accompanied with a "bypass" code, to be copyright infringe-
ment. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 11, Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scan-
dinavia Online AB (D. Mass. 2000) (No. 00-10485-EPH), available at
http://www.epic.org/free-speech/censorware/cp-conclusions.htm. Later on, the Librarian of
Congress exempted this kind of reverse engineering from liability under the anti-circumvention
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It is a matter of freedom of expression; it disables public supervision
of the moral criteria chosen by unelected and unaccountable corpora-
tions. Indeed, the software producers can do so, and parents can buy
the product. A parent is allowed to knowingly substitute his or her
own moral reasoning and beliefs about education with the unknown
choices of a corporation. The free speech problem arises when the
software is installed in public institutions, such as public libraries. By
installing filtering software, a public library in practice delegates its
constitutional obligation not to interfere with freedom of speech,
though it may itself be vulnerable to constitutional challenge. 168 This is
an unfortunate event, especially in light of the many shortcomings of
the software.
This problem is enhanced by the features of the industry at stake.
There is a fierce competition among the producers of filtering soft-
ware, and it seems that the competition drives them to block more
rather than less. Another deficiency is that most of the programs are
aimed at the American market, i.e., at English content, and to the
extent that moral judgments are made, they attempt to address the
American taste.169
The current level of technology does not filter out 100 percent of
pornographic content; it filters much more and, at the same time,
much less. There is a long list of web sites which were erroneously
blocked, 70 ranging from sites on breast cancer, sexual education, gays
and lesbians, and planned parenthood, to sites of political organiza-
tions and candidates, a site which watches and criticizes the filtering
software industry, 171 and even some sites containing legal documents
rules of the Digital Copyright Millennium Act, according to the authority given to him to do so
under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000). See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556 (Oct. 27,
2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
168. Indeed, a US court found that a public library's decision to install filtering software
runs afoul of the First Amendment. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun
County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 570 (1998). An act that conditioned certain financial sup-
port to public libraries on installing filtering software has also been found unconstitutional, Am.
Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), but this decision was re-
versed by the Supreme Court, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003). See Children's Internet Protection Act
("CIPA") § 1712, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335, 2763A-340 (2000).
169. For a similar argument, see Carolyn Penfold, The Online Services Amendment, Internet
Content Filters, and User Empowerment, 2000 NAT'L L. REV. (Austrl.), at http://pandora.nla.
gov.au/parchive/2001/Z2001-Mar-13/web.nlr.com.au/nlrHTML/Article/penfold2/ penfold2.htm.
170. Some of these cases are mentioned in Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 556 n.2;
Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47, and others are documented in a web site
devoted to critically analyzing filtering software. See PeaceFire, http://www.peacefire.org/.
171. See Peacefire, Blocking Software FAQ, http://www.peacefire.org/info/blocking-
software-faq.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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and cases. 72 At the same time, independent surveys and studies found
that the current software fails in filtering up to 20 percent of the por-
nographic sites.,"
For the sake of the discussion, we are willing to assume that this
is a transitional problem, and that technology will be developed that
can block no more and no less than it is designed to. In many cases,
this is a rather easy task which does not raise many constitutional
difficulties. If an image of child pornography is blocked, neither an
American nor a European court will object. But here lies the prob-
lem: in many cases it is unclear, and it cannot be made clear, in ad-
vance whether the content at stake is harmful to children or not. A
court can decide so in retrospect, but what is the line between that
which is harmful to a child and that which is not? Is an image of a
naked person necessarily harmful? It might be a picture in a biology
book, or a painting in a museum, or Michelangelo's statute of David.
The answer lies in several factors that technology cannot "know" and
cannot "understand": the context in which the content appears, the
age of the user, the time and place, and the community's moral stan-
dards. 74 The conclusion is that the filtering software limits the
"breathing space" which is so necessary for free speech. All of these
problems are further enhanced by the inability to distinguish a child
from a teenager from an adult, for whom the same content is not con-
sidered "harmful."
The problems caused by filtering can be illustrated by the experi-
ence in the UK. The UK government is committed to extending ac-
cess to the Internet in schools and public libraries. No obligation
exists in the UK for libraries to use filtering and rating software on
public Internet stations. Instead, whether such guards are to be used
is the decision of the local authority responsible for the library. The
Library Association, in not endorsing filtering software, warns that it
172. Thus, for instance, a decision of the Israeli Supreme Court on gays' fights was blocked
by a filtering program installed in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. See Letter of Adv. Dori
Spivak to Adv. Pappi Yakirevitch (July 19, 2000) (on file with the authors).
173. See Consumer Reports, Digital Chaperones for Kids: Which Internet Filters Protect the
Best? Which Get in the Way?, March 2001, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/main/
detail.jsp?CONTENT%3C%3Ecntid=18867& FOLDER%3C%3Efolder -id=18151&bmUID=
996766578117; Victoria Rideout et. al., Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, See No Evil: How
Internet Filters Affect the Search for Online Health Information (Executive Summary),
http://www.kff.org/content/2002/3294/Internet-Filtering-exec-summ.pdf (Dec. 2002).
174. The Miller test, applied in the US to define obscenity relies, inter alia, on "community
standards." But once we go online, what is the relevant "community"? The Supreme Court
struggled with this issue in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), concluding that the statute's
failure to define "community" does not in itself render it unconstitutional. Id. at 585-86.
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is not always effective and may lead to a false sense of security that
harmful material can no longer be accessed.175 The Association fur-
ther argues that "such software is inconsistent with the commitment
or duty of a library or information service to provide all publicly
available information in which its users claim legitimate interest.
176
Before allowing public access, libraries are encouraged to develop an
"Acceptable Use Policy," which will determine who has access, what
charges apply, whether it is filtered, and a code of conduct for users.
This may include whether users will be required to have a user pass-
word or at least register their name at the time of use, either of which
can raise privacy issues. A policy paper issued by the Networked Pol-
icy Task Group advises those managing libraries on the pros and cons
of filtering, and while not coming to any specific recommendation,
emphasizes the need to have a policy in place. 177 While the govern-
ment has not legislated or made funding conditional on installing fil-
tering software, information is provided to schools and on-line centers
to help decide what measures are most suitable to limit harmful
Internet content. 178 Such guidance accepts that some people may find
a "culture of responsible use amongst their adult users is preferable to
software filtering," and directs centers to consider the flexibility of a
system for different-aged users before fitting filtering software.
79
Much is therefore left to the local authorities to decide what ap-
proach to take. The different approaches taken in various areas have
been shaped by a process of trial and error, rather than through
courtroom battles as in the US. For example, Gloucester Council ini-
tially required written parental consent for children to gain unfiltered
access to the Internet in a public library, as filtering software was
thought to block out legitimate sites.1 80 However, this was argued to
be inadequate, as parents do not always know what sites their chil-
dren will access once on-line.181 Consequently, the policy was changed
so that children were allowed access only to computers fitted with a
175. Library Association, Guidance Notes on the Use of Filtering Software in Libraries,
http://www.la-hq.org.uk/directory/profissues/filter2.html (2000).
176. Library Association, The Use of Filtering Software in Libraries, http://www.la-
hq.org.uk/directory/profissues/filter.html (1999).
177. Sara Ormes, An Introduction to Filtering,
http://www.ukoln.ac.uk/public/earl/issuepapers/filtering.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).
178. See, e.g., Superhighway Safety, http://www.saftey.ngfl.gov.uk/.
179. Superhighway Safety, Internet Filtering Systems,
http://safety.ngfl.gov.uk/ukonline/pdf/d3.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
180. GLOUCESTER ECHO, Apr. 30, 2002.
181. Id.
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filter, with a number of unfiltered machines being left aside for adult
use only. 182 Other libraries are more stringent and fit all computers
with a filter, allowing teenagers and children under sixteen access to
the machines only with parental permission.183 On one occasion, a
local authority in Glasgow shut down all access to the Internet tem-
porarily after a school child gained access to pornography in a public
library. 184 Prior to this, filters on all computers had been scrapped as
they were found to be blocking legitimate sites.185
While the policies of these libraries may not have been met with
same legal challenges as were libraries in the US, that is not to say
that all attempts to protect children have been met with approval.
Complaints have been made that blocking software prevents access to
certain political and religious sites.186 In one instance, a local authority
was threatened with legal action after the filtering software blocked
the far right British National Party web site, and later allowed the site
to be accessed.1 87 Such complaints are supported by concerns voiced
in a recent study that that filtering software can block access to im-
portant information on health issues.188
The lesson is that technology can be an aid in shielding children
from on-line pornography, but it has a substantial social cost: it means
that, in essence, we desert the educational avenue; it means we dele-
gate our moral judgments as moral agents and as a society at large to
technology, a technology that is quite resistant to inspection; and it
means we pay a price in terms of free speech. At the end of the day,
technology cannot, and should not, substitute for human judgments.
3. The European Action Plan
The institutions of the European Union started looking into the
matter of protecting children from harmful material available in the
182. Gloucester Council fitted eighty of its 200 library computers with filters following a
complaint from a mother that witnessed teenagers accessing indecent images in a library.
GLOUCESTER ECHO, Nov. 21, 2002.
183. For the Manchester Library Policy, see Manchester City Council, Using the Internet,
http://www.manchester.gov.uk/libraries/ict/intemet.htm (last updated Jan. 20, 2003).
184. Graeme Murray, Schools in New Bid to Block Web Porn, EVENING TIMES (Glasgow),
Sept. 16, 2002, at 2 (referring to the East Ayrshire Council).
185. Gerry Braiden, New Rules to Protect Scots Pupils from Net Perverts: Youngsters Will
Not Be Given E-Mail Names, EVENING TIMES (Glasgow), Mar. 21, 2001, at 5.
186. See Censorship Concern, ESSEX CHRON., Nov. 15, 2002, at 2.
187. Around Wales: Monmouthshire, WEST. MAIL, Oct. 29,2001, at 6.
188. Rideout et. al., supra note 173.
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digital environment in the mid-1990s. 189 From the very beginning, it
was determined that the interest in protecting children was an issue of
"overriding public interest." 90 In 1996 a comprehensive study, the
Green Paper, was published, and set the agenda:
The full potential of such developments will depend on society as a
whole striking the right balance between freedom of speech and
public interest considerations, between policies designed to foster
the emergence of new services and the need to ensure that the op-
portunities they create are not abused by the few at the expense of
the many.19'
The goal was carefully crafted so not to cover illegal materials.19
It was further observed that adults have a different interest than chil-
dren: "[tihe aim is therefore limited to preventing minors from en-
countering, by accident or otherwise, material that might affect their
physical and/or mental development. '"1 93 Interestingly, the document
also raises the issue of variance between minors of various ages.19 4
These principles were expressed based on the assumption that the
digital environment carries with it many advantages, and that the new
technology requires a different treatment than the old media. 95 Ac-
cordingly, the Green Paper proposed that different solutions are
adopted for these different problems.
The possible negative effect on freedom of expression was also
recognized, as the above quoted passage illustrates. 196 The Green Pa-
per instructed that any regulation should take it into account under
the criteria set forth in the ECHR.
Private-ordering was the option advocated by the Green Paper
(termed there self-regulation), and was then adopted by the Euro-
189. See European Union Communication on Illegal and Harmful Material, COM(96) 487
(proposing policy options for immediate actions); Telecommunications Council of Ministers'
resolution concerning dissemination of illegal material over the Internet (Sep. 1996), available at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/internet/98-97en.html.
190. See Green Paper, supra note 22, at 1.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 6, ch. I, § 1. The illegal material was classified as a "general category of material
that violates human dignity," and includes primarily "child pornography, extreme gratuitous
violence and incitement to racial and other hatred, discrimination, and violence." To combat
child pornography, for example, the EU established police hotlines for users to complain, spe-
cial police units, a system of cooperation among the Member States, and several international
operations took place.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 19, ch. II, § 2.2.2 ("... it is doubtful whether children of four have the same prob-
lems as adolescents of 15").
195. For the comparison of the new media to the old media, see id. at 7-11, ch. I, §§ 2-2.5.
196. See id. at 13, ch. II, §§ 1-1.1.
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pean Commission and the European Parliament. 197 But this approach
should not be mistaken for a liberal hands-off attitude. Rather, the
underlying but clear direction was that self-regulation can be assisted
by the State. The goal was set accordingly, to create a common
framework for self-regulation, 198 and national frameworks within the




Self-regulation was to be achieved in cooperation with the indus-
tries. Some of the measures mentioned were drafting codes of con-
duct and identifying areas where there might be a need for common
standards of labeling material.2 1 In addition, it was suggested to raise
awareness of users, especially of parents. Codes of conduct, as later
EU documents elaborated, should inform users of any risks from the
content, provide a warning page, visual signal, or a sound signal, have
a descriptive labeling or classification of content, and apply a system
to check the users' age, support parental control measures, and han-
dle complaints.20° In most EU countries there are now operative codes
of conduct.203
These recommendations were followed up.2°4 The most ambitious
project undertaken was the multi-annual, 25-million-Euro Safer
Internet Action Plan, which took place between 1999 and 2002.21 The
197. See Council Recommendation, supra note 22, at 50-51 (detailing the various measures
taken following the Green Paper).
198. See Green Paper, supra note 22, at 24-25, ch. III, § 3.1.
199. See Council Recommendation, supra note 22, at 50, Art. 1 (1).
200. See id., recital 10, at 49.
201. See Green Paper, supra note 22, at 25, ch. III, § 3.2.
202. See Council Recommendation, supra note 22, at 52-55.
203. See Evaluation Report From the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment on the Application of Council Recommendation of 24 Sept. 1998 Concerning the Protec-
tion of Minors and Human Dignity, COM(01)106 final at 5-6, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/regul/new srv/erminen.pdf; see also Council Conclusions of
23 July 2001 on the Commission's Evaluation Report on the Application of the Recommenda-
tion Concerning the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity, 2001 O.J. (C 213) 10, 11, avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/c_213/c_21320010731en00100011.pdf;
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Intermediate Evaluation of the
Implementation of the Multiannual Community Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the
Internet by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global Networks, COM(01)690 final at
2-7, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_..0690en01.pdf.
204. See Council Conclusions of 17 Dec. 1999 on the Protection of Minors in Light of the
Development of Digital Audiovisual Services, Art. 9, 2000 O.J. (C 8) 8, 9, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/c 008/c_00820000112en00080009.pdf.
205. See Decision No. 276/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
Jan. 1999 Adopting a Multiannual Community Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the
Internet by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global Networks, Art. 1, 1999 OJ. (L
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European Union supported dozens of projects designed to create the
common and national framework for self-regulation, focusing on
three avenues: (1) Hotlines: creating a European network of hotlines
to report illegal material. The projects resulted in a group of fourteen
countries (including some non-European countries, such as the US
and Australia) that have hotlines grouped together into a cooperative
system, known as INHOPE.2 6 (2) Rating and Filtering: several pro-
jects examined technological solutions. The intermediate assessment
was that self-labeling and filtering schemes were not a practical solu-
tion for Europeans, at least in the year 2000, and that third-party fil-
tering software products require major improvements. 27 One of the
problems identified was the English language focus of most current
filtering technology.20 8 (3) Awareness: various projects to inform users
of the risks and chances online. Furthermore, associations of ISPs
were established throughout the EU, including in a pan-European
association.2°9 The Action Plan has been considered by the EU to be a
success, and it is considering extending it for two more years.210
The UK government follows the European preference for self-
regulation of the Internet. While the government has proposed the
creation of a new criminal offense of "sexual grooming" on the Inter-
net, for which individuals can be prosecuted before any sexual act has
taken place,211 it also launched the Internet Taskforce on Child Pro-
tection in 2001 to review Internet content rating systems, develop a
"kitemarking" scheme for chat rooms, and promote "safe surfing"
33) 1, 3, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1999/l_033/1_03319990206en
00010011.pdf; see also Safer Internet, http://www.saferinternet.org.
206. See http://www.inhope.org.
207. See the European Union's announcement, Commission Issues Reports on Parental
Control Technologies Aimed at Enhancing Safety of Internet, IP/00/621 (Brussels, 15 June
2000), available at http://europa.eu.intISPO/docs/services/docs/2000/June/ip_0O_621en.pdL
208. Accordingly, one of the projects funded by the E.U. Action Plan aims at developing a
multi-lingual filtering tool. See http://www.net-protect.org/en/scope.htm.
209. See European Internet Services Providers Association, http://www.euroispa.org.
210. See Follow-up to the Multiannual Community Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of
the Internet by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global Networks, COM(02)152
final at 3, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2002/en_502PC0152.pdf. The
proposal is to extend the action plan also to new technologies that have been developed in the
meantime, such as mobile and broadband content, peer-to-peer file sharing systems, chat rooms,
instant messaging and more.
211. In one area, calls were even being made to prevent children from using Internet chat
rooms in public libraries, following concerns that two murdered girls had possibly been
"groomed" through a chat room. See Chatroom Ban in Bid to Cut Abuse, KENT & SUSSEX
COURIER, Aug. 30, 2002, at 5. The use of chat rooms in this way shows a new problem caused
by the Internet, as such text would not always infringe the Obscene Publications Act. See Ak-
deniz & Srossen, supra note 38, at 223.
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education and awareness for parents and children.212 The UK gov-
ernment also recently launched a new campaign warning of the dan-
gers to children from using chat rooms, publishing a code of practice
for operators of chat rooms developed jointly by the government,
Internet bodies, and child protection agencies.
2 13
The Internet Watch Foundation ("IWF") was established in 1996
with the support of the UK government, although it is not a govern-
ment agency. The IWF operates a hotline to which Internet users can
report illegal material, which is then passed on to the police, and
which leads to ISPs being issued a notice to take down the illegal ma-
terial.2 4 The fear exists that if this means removing newsgroups that
contain some illegal material,25 this could also remove much legal
content along with it. The organization promotes the use of voluntary
ratings systems and filtering systems among parents, teachers, and
others responsible for children. The IWF also seeks to educate users
about the dangers on the Internet, especially for children, and ways of
dealing with such problems. The division of functions in this way is
argued to reflect the division between illegal and harmful material,
promoting merely educational and voluntary measures in relation to
the latter.
216
212. See Improving Child Protection on the Internet: A Partnership for Action,
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/childprotnet.pdf (Mar. 28, 2001).
213. See http://www.thinkuknow.co.uk. The Code of Practice suggests chat room operators
should include a virtual panic buttons and safety messages for child users. See Stuart Millar,
Chat Room Danger Prompts New Safety Code, GUARDIAN, Jan. 6, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/story/0,3604,869385,00.html.
214. In 2001, the hotline processed 11,357 reports, "leading to notices to UK ISPs to take
down 3332 web sites and newsgroup articles containing images of child abuse and 2949 reports
to police for investigation." See Internet Watch Foundation, 2001 Annual Review (2002),
http://www.iwf.org.uk/about/annual-report/ar2002/css/ar2002_2.htm [hereinafter IWF 2001
Annual Review]. The Hotline has been criticized in previous years on the basis that the figures
tell us little as the actual amount of child pornography on the Internet is unknown. It
is, therefore, difficult to judge how successful the UK hotline has been. Another down-
side is that the efforts of the organisation are concentrated on the newsgroups carried
by the UK ISPs. This means that while illegal material is removed from the UK ISPs
servers, the same material will continue to be available on the Internet carried by the
foreign ISPs in their own servers.
Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties (UK), Who Watches the Watchmen Part II: Accountability &
Effective Self-Regulation in the Information Age, http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen-ii.htm
(Sept. 1998) [hereinafter Who Watches the Watchmen].
215. The IWF recommends to ISPs not to host newsgroups that regularly contain child
pornography or newsgroups that appear to advertise pedophile content or activity. See Internet
Watch Foundation, IWF Tightens Net on Child Abuse,
http://www.iwf.org.uk/news/press/detail-press.epl?INFO-ID=106 (Feb. 13, 2002); Internet
Watch Foundation, National Crime Squad Raids Confirm Newsgroup Strategy,
http://www.iwf.org.uk/news/press/detail-press.epl?INFO-ID=102 (Nov. 28, 2001).
216. Sutter, supra note 141, at 370-71.
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While the IWF is an independent body, it works closely with the
government and in the 2001-02 financial year, it received state
funds.217 It also liaises with other regulators, such as the Broadcasting
Standards Commission and the British Board of Film Classification,
and with industry, such as the Internet Service Providers Association
and the London Internet Exchange. In addition to this, the organiza-
tion has frequent exchanges with children's charities, and has at-
tempted to work internationally with groups on similar projects.
Concern was initially expressed about the lack of involvement from
civil liberties groups,218 though later the Board was reconstituted to
gain more balance. While the IWF has been seeking a broader base of
subscribers, most of its funding has come from ISPs,219 and it is still
very much linked to the industry.
The IWF has been criticized on the grounds that it operates as a
regulatory body providing a public function involved in the develop-
ment of government policy, but with the status of a private body.220
This function will remain in the hands of the IWF even after the es-
tablishment of a new communications regulator. 221 This is indeed one
of the constitutional difficulties with a legal regime of private-
ordering-the private bodies are, depending on the extent of horizon-
tal effect, beyond the reach of constitutional law.22 2 Consequently, it
has been argued that the body has avoided many of its public respon-
sibilities, such as providing open information on why certain policies
such as filtering are to be preferred, without proper public consulta-
tion or the normal channels of accountability. 223 In advising whether
material is illegal, the IWF can be argued to be performing a quasi-
217. See IWF 2001 Annual Review, supra note 213.
218. Akdeniz & Strossen, supra note 38, at 224-25.
219. See IWF 2001 Annual Review, supra note 213. However, it has also received grants
from the European Commission.
220. Who Watches the Watchmen, supra note 214. For similar criticisms, see Cyber-Rights
and Cyber-Liberties (UK), Memorandum for the Internet Content Summit 1999,
http://www.cyber-rights.org/reports/summit99.htm (Sept. 1999).
221. The initial remit of the new Office of Communications ("OFCOM"), established in the
Office of Communications Act of 2002, does not include regulation of the Internet. Instead,
OFCOM will support and promote the existing mechanisms of tackling illegal materials, in
particular working with the IWF. See Department of Trade and Industry, Communications
White Paper, 6.10, available at http://www.communicationswhitepaper.gov.uk/pdf/ch6.pdf (last
visited Nov. 25, 2003).
222. Even if the IWF was deemed to be a public authority for the purposes of Section 6 of
the Human Rights Act, a constitutional challenge would be harder to sustain given that the
IWF's role is largely advisory rather than providing a direct restraint.
223. Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties (UK), Who Watches the Watchmen: Internet Content
Rating Systems, and Privatised Censorship, http://www.cyber-rights.org/watchmen.htm (Nov.
1997). However, steps have been taken to improve the situation.
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judicial function that draws the boundary between illegal and harmful
content. A further concern is that, by encouraging systems that go
beyond the realm of the illegal material, and seeking to restrict harm-
ful content through the promotion of filters and ratings, the body will
step into the realms of censoring legitimate speech in the name of
protecting children. Critics have argued that it would be preferable to
have political action by a democratically elected and accountable
government rather than "random censorship by law enforcement au-
thorities or by self regulatory bodies. 2 24 A defense can be made that
much of the IWF's work concerns child pornography, a subject about
which there is an overall consensus and little in the way of legal ambi-
guity.221 Furthermore the IWF enjoys the support of the industry in
that it helps shield ISPs from potential liability by pointing out the
illegal material that should be removed, without the ISPs having to
provide resources to monitor and handle complaints.226
CONCLUSION
Digital technology crosses borders, and brings with it promises
for empowerment and democratization, but in the short history of the
Internet, it is also clear that pornography is global. In this Article, we
looked at the European approach to the harms caused to children by
the easy availability of such material online.
While the problem is not unique to Europe, thus far, European
countries have opted for a very different approach than that opted for
in the US. While the US attempted, and failed, the direct public-
ordering approach-the 1996 CDA and its replacement, COPA-
Europe chose a mixed approach of indirect public-ordering and pri-
vate-ordering. Broadly speaking, this approach better fits Etzioni's
analysis than the US approach.
There might be many political, sociological, and other explana-
tions for this difference in approach. By way of conclusion, we wish to
propose that the legal environment might be one such explanation:
freedom of speech is recognized in Europe and protected, but its
structure enables balancing it with other public interests. In light of
this approach, the puzzle is even greater: European versions of the
US CDA or COPA are far more likely to survive scrutiny in Europe
224. Akdeniz & Strossen, supra note 38, at 224.




than in the US. Nevertheless, this path was not taken. We want to
speculate that the reason for the different approaches can be found
here: The strong protection that the First Amendment provides in the
US does not leave much room for other interests, or balancing rights
and interests, and the constitutional clash between freedom of speech
and the interest in protecting children from harmful material is inevi-
table.
In Europe, the initial point is different. It is one of compromise
and balancing. This renders the clash between the rival interests and
rights less charged, at least on a legal-constitutional level. Once the
rival interests are on a par, normatively speaking, there is a more re-
laxed atmosphere to devise a delicate balance. Private-ordering,
which minimizes governmental interference, is such a solution.
However, this is not to say that the issue of protecting children
on-line is less important in Europe than it is in the US. The newspa-
pers are full of stories of the dangers to children that lurk on the
Internet. In spite of the more relaxed legal environment, the Euro-
pean approach has taken note of the difficulties in US public-ordering
and attempts to avoid such conflicts or embarrassments. Imposing
direct public-ordering may threaten to create an issue that will polar-
ize competing interest groups and lobbies, and thereby undermine the
more balanced approach to expression rights that has been described.
Furthermore, the difficulties in defining and enforcing direct public
controls provide another deterrent. Regulating with the cooperation
of the Internet industry is more likely to be practicably administered
and less divisive.
This form of regulation does not come without difficulties. It is
unlikely to prevent children from accessing all material deemed
harmful. Furthermore, it has the potential to act as censorship, but in
a more subtle form. The actions of those deciding what types of mate-
rial is harmful is less likely to fall foul of the schemes of constitutional
protection. The less charged environment in Europe may also permit
this type of approach. While fewer groups demand outright prohibi-
tion of harmful material, fewer groups also cry foul when such private
organizations attempt to act as censors. The approach in Europe may
be less divisive and high profile than the legislative attempts in the
US, but it nevertheless carries costs.
Justice Louis Brandeis once noted, "[i]t is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
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nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. '' 227 Nowa-
days, culture, economy, and politics are more global than ever before,
the technology of the Internet is borderless, but principles of political
morality are still universal, even if their concrete application is local.
Europe and the United States can each serve as a laboratory to each
other.
227. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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